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Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants:
The United States, West Germany, and
Canada
By THOMAS GILLER
Member of the Class of 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Preliminary Statement
The commercial nuclear power industry is experiencing difficult
times. Since 1979, the year of the reactor accident at Three Mile Is-
land, Pennsylvania, over twenty-five reactors planned for construction
have been cancelled.' Even before the Three Mile Island accident,
however, there had been only one new order for a nuclear power plant
in the United States since 1976.2 This was the result of a combination
of reactor cost, technical problems, and slowed growth in the demand
for electricity following the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
There has also been growing concern among world leaders about
the potential use of commercial nuclear power programs to produce
nuclear weapons, particularly since India's so-called "peaceful" deto-
nation of a nuclear explosive device in 1974.3 The question of nuclear
proliferation is, in many ways, the ultimate environmental issue. Some
have suggested that nuclear technology be removed from international
commerce until more adequate safeguards against nuclear proliferation
are developed.4
Despite all of the considerations weighing against the future devel-
opment of nuclear power, the fact remains that nuclear energy supplies
1. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, A NEW ALTERNATIVE TO COMPLETING NINE
MILE POINT UNIT 2 NUCLEAR STATION: ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, app. K-I
(1981).
2. C. COOK, NUCLEAR POWER AND LEGAL ADVOCACY at xi (1980).
3. If plutonium, produced as a by-product of uranium irradiation in a reactor, is sepa-
rated from the fission products in the reactor, it can be used either to manufacture reactor
fuel or nuclear weapons. See generally FORD FOUNDATION, ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS 414-15 (1979).
4. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 87 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
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a substantial amount of electricity throughout the world, and will pre-
sumably continue to do so for some time into the future. In the United
States, for example, there are over seventy operable nuclear reactors,$
accounting for about thirteen percent of the total electricity generated
nationwide.6 Worldwide, excluding centrally-planned economies, nu-
clear generating capacity is slightly over one hundred gigawatts of
electricity.7
Therefore, even assuming that no new commercial nuclear reac-
tors are built in the foreseeable future, the problems created by the
substantial number of existing plants must still be faced. These
problems include both nuclear weapons proliferation and the technical
difficulties of reactor operation, as noted above, as well as the very seri-
ous concerns over radioactive waste management.
The nuclear reactor itself represents one important facet of radio-
active waste management. Nuclear plants must eventually be shut
down, or decommissioned. While the front end of the nuclear fuel cy-
cle8 is covered by detailed legislation and regulations in most countries
with active nuclear energy industries, very little attention has been
given to reactor decommissioning. 9
Of the more than 260 nuclear power reactors in the world today,
approximately 150 will be at least twenty-five years old and some over
forty years old by the year 2000."0 These figures indicate that decom-
missioning will be a significant concern of the nuclear power industry
and its regulators for the remainder of this century and beyond.
5. NUCLEONICS WK., Jan. 28, 1982, at 14. Several of these reactors, however, did not
operate at all in 1981 because of various technical problems.
6. FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 413.
7. J. YAGER, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 10 (1981). One
gigawatt = 1,000,000,000 kilowatts. All but just over two percent of this total exists in the
United States, non-communist Europe, Japan, and Canada.
8. The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to uranium mining and milling, fuel
preparation, and fueling of the reactor. P. EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, ECOS-
CIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT 430-31, 434-36 (1977).
9. von Busekist, Legal,4spects ofthe Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities, in DECOM-
MISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 No-
VEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND NEA (OECD) 29 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as von Busekist].
10. Foreward to DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF A
SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND
NEA (OECD) (1979) [hereinafter cited as IAEA 1979]. The expected operating life of a
commercial nuclear power reactor is 30 to 40 years, although no commercial reactors have
been in operation that long. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for exam-
ple, limits nuclear reactor operating licenses to 40 years, including construction time. J.
ANDERSON, D. AQUILINA & D. RODBOURNE, DECOMMISSIONING COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CURA].
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Decommissioning should be an issue of particular concern in countries
with well-established nuclear energy programs which have had operat-
ing commercial reactors for up to twenty years, such as in the United
States, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many). Nuclear reactor decommissioning may be of less pressing con-
cern for nations with recently established nuclear energy programs,
because they may have the time to profit from the decommissioning
experience of other nations. This reliance on the learning curve could,
however, be frustrated by a reactor accident or technical problems re-
quiring premature reactor shutdown and decommissioning. t
B. Purpose and Scope of Note
In the quarter of a century of commercial nuclear power activity,
relatively little has been done to plan for and provide guidance in
decommissioning nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities.'? Be-
cause all nuclear reactors eventually must be decommissioned, how-
ever, it is important to understand decommissioning within the context
of the nuclear regulatory framework. In addition, because decommis-
sioning has largely been overlooked in the decisions to build and li-
cense nuclear plants, information about its substantial economic and
health and safety costs has not been presented to the consumers of nu-
clear power.
This Note will first introduce the reader to what decommissioning
11. See infra text accompanying notes 92-103 for a discussion or the significance of
premature reactor shutdown to decommissioning.
12. Although this Note concentrates on examining policy options for regulating and
financing the decommissioning of commercial nuclear power reactors, other types of nuclear
facilities also must eventually be decommissioned. These include uranium mills, fuel
fabrication plants, fuel reprocessing plants, government-owned and operated test reactors.
and nuclear powered submarines. Each of these facilities presents unique technical and
regulatory decommissioning problems, detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this
Note. Where relevant, however, reference will be made in this Note to decommissioning of
non-power reactor nuclear facilities. For a brief summary of this subject, see CURA. .pra
note 10, at 2-4. Many of the issues and potential solutions raised in regard to commercial
reactor decommissioning apply equally to the decommissioning of other types of facilities.
For example, the United States General Accounting Office has estimated that the cost to
decommission federally-owned nuclear facilities will run into the billions of dollars, though
data to make more detailed estimates is not available. Decommnisioning and Decontamina-
tion Hearings Before the Subcomnt on the Environment and the Atmosphere of the House
Com on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, 81 (1977) (statement of Monte
Canfield, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 1977]. Potential transboundary implications of
decommissioning reactors sited close to national borders are also not specifically addressed.
See generally Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1941):
Corfu Channel Case (Al v. U.K.), 1949 I.CJ. 4. Both cases stand for the principle that no
nation may permit activities on its soil that will cause harm to another nation.
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is and why it is important (sections two and three). A general under-
standing of this background information will give the reader a greater
appreciation of the legal and public policy significance as well as the
problems of reactor decommissioning.
The Note will then examine decommissioning policies in three na-
tions with active commercial nuclear power industries-the United
States (section four), West Germany (section five), and Canada (section
six). Though all three countries have made substantial commitments to
nuclear power, they each approach nuclear power regulation with dif-
ferent legal frameworks and from somewhat different philosophical
viewpoints. As a result, decommissioning policy, or in many respects
the lack thereof, varies among the three countries. At the same time,
there has been recent recognition in all three countries that decommis-
sioning is a nuclear regulatory problem that must be addressed.
Each country's decommissioning policy will first be analyzed
within that country's legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear
power. Particular problems of authority between federal and state or
provincial bodies will be analyzed. Potential and actual schemes for
assuring that adequate funds are available for decommissioning will be
discussed within the overall system of public utility regulation in each
nation.
Section seven of the Note will briefly consider the role of two ma-
jor international agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the development
of decommissioning policies.
Section eight will offer a series of recommendations for policy re-
sponses to reactor decommissioning. Some of the recommendations of-
fered are specific to each nation. Most of the recommendations,
however, address regulatory concerns that cut across national
boundaries.
Radioactive waste disposal and storage policies are not discussed
in detail, but only to the extent that they provide insight into reactor
decommissioning issues. At the same time, however, it will be estab-
lished that decommissioning policy cannot be completely settled unless
and until a radioactive waste policy is adopted. 3
Throughout this discussion, decommissioning should be viewed as
an example of a problem created by modem technology requiring a
well-defined policy response in the face of large technical and eco-
13. See infra text accompanying notes 46-62.
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nomic uncertainties. It would seem that substantial uncertainty is inev-
itable until individual commercial nuclear plants are actually
decommissioned. Even then, because nuclear plants tend to be unique
in many of their characteristics, much uncertainty will likely persist.
Because decommissioning, and nuclear technology in general, is highly
complex and uncertain in many respects, policy makers must balance
the need to plan for decommissioning now against the need to retain
sufficient regulatory flexibility to incorporate subsequent changes in
our understanding of the costs and technology of the process. t4
II. DECOMMISSIONING: WHAT IT IS
AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
Decommissioning involves the permanent shutdown of a nuclear
facility and the eventual return of the nuclear site to unrestricted public
use. According to the American National Standards Institute, decom-
missioning includes: "1) decontamination of the structures and equip-
ment, 2) removal of sources of radioactivity, 3) return of the site to a
condition wherein it may safely be returned to unrestricted surface use,
and 4) maintenance under the minimum surveillance required for the
protection of public health and safety. . ."i Decommissioning is dis-
tinguished from decontamination in that, in the former, the nuclear fa-
cility is permanently shut down, while in the latter, equipment
radiation levels are reduced so that the equipment may be put back in
service.
There are a number of reasons why a nuclear facility must eventu-
ally be decommissioned. These include technical obsolescence, in-
creasing operation and maintenance costs, 16 and, most importantly, the
radioactivity accumulated in the facility's components. 7 Even if nu-
clear power plants can outlast their currently projected thirty- to forty-
year-lives, decommissioning is still an issue which must ultimately be
faced. In fact, projected plant lives may be shortened by technical
problems or accidents.
During the operation of a nuclear reactor, some of the neutrons
14. For an excellent discussion of high technology and the courts, using nuclear power
as a case study, see Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Needfor
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1981).
15. Quoted in CURA, supra note 10, at 1.
16. Maestas, Experience and Plans for the Deconmissioning of Nuclear Reactors in
OECD-Nuclear Energy Agency Countries, in DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 349, 354 (M. Osterhout ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Maestas].
17. CURA, supra note 10, at 1.
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produced by uranium fuel pass into the steel structures supporting the
fuel tubes, the steel vessel holding the fuel, the coolant and cooling
water, and even into the massive concrete shield surrounding the reac-
tor vessel.18 These neutrons are eventually absorbed by the normally
stable isotopes of iron, nickel, and other elements in the steel, water,
and concrete, converting them into unstable isotopes called "activation
products."' 9 These unstable isotopes will eventually undergo radioac-
tive decay, either directly to stable isotopes or through a chain of other
unstable isotopes, thus emitting potentially hazardous radiation.20 The
decay times of different activation products vary widely from a small
fraction of a second to many thousands of years.2'
Since these activation products are created within the materials of
the reactor, the reactor building, and other associated equipment, they
are unlikely to be released into the environment unless the materials
themselves are allowed to corrode, decay, or disintegrate. The activa-
tion products, however, are still a source of penetrating radiation and
people must be shielded from them until they decay to "safe" levels.22
There are three basic methods presently recognized for decommis-
sioning nuclear reactors: mothballing, entombment, and dismantling.
Various combinations of these three methods have also been suggested
as possible decommissioning strategies. 23
In all three decommissioning methods, the reactor fuel is removed
from the plant after shutdown, following a "cooling-of' period of ap-
proximately 150 days.24 Fuel and any other radioactive materials, in-
18. Harwood, May, Resnikoff, Schlenger & Tames, The Cost of Turning it 0T, 18 ENV'T
17 (Dec. 1976) [hereinafter cited as The Cost of Turning it Of].
19. Id
20. Id
21. For example, while radioactive iron (Iron 55) has a half-life of 2.6 years, radioactive
nickel in steel (Nickel 59) has a half-life of approximately 80,000 years. An element's half-
life reflects the amount of time it takes for half of the element's radioactive energy to decay.
Id. at 18-19.
22. What constitutes a "safe level" of radiation exposure is a subject of intense debate,
with different nations and organizations varying in their interpretation of "safe levels" of
radiation exposure. See e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EFFECTS ON POPIULA-
TIONS OF EXPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: 1980 (1980); NUCLEAR EN-
ERGY POLICY STUDY GROUP, FORD FOUNDATION, NUCLEAR POWER: ISSUES AND CIIOICES
159-87 (1977); J. GOFMAN, RADIATION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1981).
23. These combinations include recommissioning, entombment without the highly radi-
oactive reactor parts followed by delayed dismantlement, and entombment followed by
delayed dismantlement. These alternative decommissioning methods arc discussed in
CURA, supra note 10, at 35-39.
24. The removal of nuclear waste from the reactor site in the preliminary stages of
decommissioning should be considered as hypothetical, since this procedure has not been
carried out on a large commercial nuclear power plant.
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cluding fuel assemblies, in the plant's holding tanks are then removed
from the site and taken to a waste storage or disposal site." These
materials contain the bulk of the radiation in the plant.
2 6
At this point, the different decommissioning options diverge.
Mothballing, the first option, consists of placing the facility in a state of
protective storage. According to the United States Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) Regulatory Guide 1.86, this entails "radiation
monitoring, environmental surveillance, and appropriate security pro-
cedures . . to ensure that the health and safety of the public is not
endangered."'27 It is not clear how long a plant would have to be main-
tained in this state of protective storage, but oversight would presuma-
bly be required at least until radioactivity had decayed to levels
sufficient to allow the site to be released for unrestricted use38 Accord-
ing to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning
of Nuclear Facilities, mothballing (now called SAFSTOR by the NRC)
consists of a short period of preparation for storage, up to two years,
followed by a variable period of protective storage of up to one hun-
dred years.29
Entombment involves "sealing" the remaining radioactive materi-
als "within a structure integral with the biological shield."3 After fuel
assemblies and radioactive fluids are removed from the reactor site, the
reactor vessel and any other remaining components containing signifi-
cant radioactivity are encased in concrete within the containment
building and any doors or openings leading into the reactor section of
the plant are closed off. This entombment process is estimated to take
approximately two years, while the concrete "tomb" itself should pro-
25. Sefcik, Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Reactors, 81 TECI. REv. 56, 62
(June/July 1979).
26. Id at 62.
27. UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, REGULATORY GUIDE 1.86, TERMINA-
TION OF OPERATING LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS C.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86].
28. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, DRAFT GENERIC ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES. NUREG-0586.
2-4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DGEIS]. The DGEIS was required because regulatory
changes that may result from the NRC's reevaluation of its decommissioning policy might
be major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Such
actions are subject to the requirement for an environmental impact statement (EIS) of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). See
infra text accompanying notes 133-37 and 164-69 for further discussion of the application of
NEPA to decommissioning.
29. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-7.
30. AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, supra note 27, at C.2.b.
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vide containment of the radioactivity until it decays to safe levels. 3t
During this period of reactor entombment, radiation surveys and envi-
ronmental sampling would be undertaken on a periodic basis to make
certain that the concrete entombment structure was in fact acting as a
sufficient radiation shield. Security guards, however, would probably
not be required, as they are with the mothballing method, because
physical access to the sealed reactor would be extremely difficult. 32
The major problem with entombment is that some of the radioac-
tive isotopes in reactors will not decay to safe levels within the time
period of the concrete entombment vessel's structural integrity, esti-
mated by the NRC to be approximately one hundred years.33 Entomb-
ment alone, therefore, may not be a viable alternative.34 Entombment
as a preferred mode of decommissioning would also leave us with "nu-
clear monuments" dotting the landscape, rendering sites unusable for
other purposes.
Dismantling, the third major mode of decommissioning, involves
removal of all radioactive materials from the site so that it may imme-
diately thereafter be released for unrestricted use.35 Dismantled radio-
active components are then taken to a waste disposal site, presumably
their permanent resting ground.36 Prompt dismantling following reac-
tor shutdown poses significant occupational health hazards, as there
has been little time for radioactive decay in the reactor vessel and its
internals, the most highly radioactive components of the plant. Total
dismantlement and plant removal is expected to take up to four years. 37
The major advantage of prompt dismantlement is that the site may
be released for unrestricted use a relatively short time after reactor
shutdown. Additionally, the need for longterm security, maintenance,
surveillance, and monitoring-all required by entombment and
31. CURA, supra note 10, at 25.
32. Hearings 1977, supra note 12, at 55 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
33. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 0-6.
34. Id But see INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION (INFCE), RE-
PORT OF WORKING GROUP 7-WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL 4 (1980), which uses
entombment as its referent decommissioning mode. Unfortunately, there is no indication of
why entombment was selected.
35. DEGIS, supra note 28, at 0-5. (Dismantling is now referred to as DECON by the
NRC). AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, supra note 27, at C.2.c.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 46-62 for a discussion of radioactive waste dispo-
sal policy. As of this date, no permanent nuclear waste disposal site has been established in
the United States. Some of the spent fuel from operating reactors is presently being stored
in holding ponds at each reactor site. See infra note 55.
37. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 0-5.
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mothballing-is avoided .3  The major disadvantages of prompt dis-
mantlement include a larger initial commitment of funds, an increased
risk of worker exposure to radiation, and a greater commitment of
waste disposal site space than in the other decommissioning
alternatives.39
An alternative to prompt dismantlement is to mothball the reactor
until the most dangerous radioactive isotopes decay to safe levels, and
only then to dismantle the reactor. This is generally referred to as
delayed dismantlement.4° Its major advantage over prompt disman-
tling is reduced worker exposure to radiation. On the other hand,
delayed dismantlement requires longer term security, surveillance, and
monitoring of the reactor site.
Whatever decommissioning option is chosen for a given reactor,"
the following factors must be considered: 1) Radiation exposure to
workers and the public, and the safety of the decommissioning proce-
dure in general; 2) environmental impacts; 3) regulatory requirements,
if any; 4) land use considerations and the reuse of the site; 5) unique
reactor and site considerations; 6) technical feasibility; and 7) cost.4"
HI. WHY WORRY ABOUT DECOMMISSIONING?
A. A Significant Aspect of the Radioactive Waste Dilemma
The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste
management, has historically been given little attention.43 Decommis-
sioning, one significant aspect of the radioactive waste management
38. Id
39. See infra text accompanying notes 44 and 59-77.
40. For a discussion of the rationale for delayed dismantlement, see CURA,supra note
10, at 27-39.
41. It is also hypothetically possible that a reactor might be recommissioned as a new
nuclear plant or converted into a fossil fuel electric generating plant. Though some nuclear
industry experts argue that nuclear plant life can be extended beyond the 30 to 40 years
generally projected at present, decommissioning will still ultimately be required. See Mac-
Donald, Evaluating Decommissioning Costsfor Nuclear Power Plants, in DECONTAMINATION
AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 695, 699 (M. Osterhout ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as MacDonald].
In addition, it seems a dubious assumption, based on the present record of the nuclear
industry, that reactors will last longer than their currently projected operating lives. The
NRC reported last year, for example, that from 13 to 46 nuclear power plant reactor vessels
appeared to have potential embrittlement problems, which could lead to early retirement for
many of them. Bull, Nuclear Wefare, 3 AMiCUS J. 13 (Winter 1982). See infra text accom-
panying notes 99-101 for an explanation of reactor embrittlement.
42. MacDonald, supra note 41, at 701.
43. See G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER, AND POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR DISPOSITION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 300 (1979).
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problem, has particularly been ignored. Discussion of reactor decom-
missioning in international and national nuclear legislation and regula-
tions is, in fact, conspicuous in its absence.
Reactor decommissioning can generate large amounts of radioac-
tive waste. For example, the radioactive waste produced in the decom-
missioning of a 1177 megawatt commercial nuclear plant has been
estimated at between 65 and 13,000 cubic yards of radioactive solid
waste and from 3600 to 159,000 gallons of liquid radioactive waste.4
These figures indicate the importance of recognizing that decommis-
sioning depends on the existence and adequacy of nuclear waste dispo-
sal sites." The development of a policy for dealing with nuclear waste
may, therefore, substantially affect decommissioning policy.
B. Classifying Decommissioning Wastes
The most significant categories of radioactive waste produced in
the process of reactor decommissioning are high-level waste (HLW)
and low-level waste (LLW).4 6 No precise definition of high-level waste
has been agreed upon.47 Categories of radioactive waste clearly consid-
ered high-level include irradiated (or spent) reactor fuel, liquid
reprocessing wastes, and the solids into which such liquid waste has
44. CURA, supra note 10, at 5. These estimates do not include the substantial quantity
of highly radioactive spent fuel which must also be transferred to nuclear waste sites. The
tremendous range of estimates is explained largely by the variability of radioactive waste
produced by different reactor types, their operating history and conditions at shutdown, and
different decommissioning methods. There is also some built-in uncertainty because these
figures are hypothetical estimates and have not been empirically validated.
For comparison, a 1000 megawatt (electric) (MWe) light water reactor discharges ap-
proximately 30 metric tons (MT) of spent fuel annually resulting in approximately 40,000
liters (approx. 10,570 gallons) of residual liquid high-level waste. NUCLEAR ENERGY POL-
IcY STUDY GROUP, FORD FOUNDATION, NUCLEAR POWER: ISSUES AND CHOICEs 246
(1977). P. EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, ECOSCIENCE: POPULATION, RESOURCES,
ENVIRONMENT 449 (1977). Over a 40 year projected nuclear plant life the total spent fuel
discharge would be approximately 1200 MT resulting in 1,600,000 liters (approx. 422,720
gallons) of residual high-level waste. It should be kept in mind, however, that the toxicity of
the wastes, and not merely their volume, is the critical factor.
45. The term "disposal" is used here in contrast to the term "storage" to refer to em-
placement of waste with no foreseeable intention of retrieval. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, § 2(9), 96 Stat. 2203 (1983). The term "storage," on the other
hand, indicates an intent to recover radioactive wastes for subsequent use, processing or
disposal. Id § 2(25).
46. For a more complete discussion of the issues of high- and low-level nuclear waste
with respect to decommissioning, see CURA, supra note 10, at 6-13.
47. The recently enacted Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat,
2201 (1983), defines high-level waste as encompassing wastes from reprocessing and such
other radioactive material determined by the NRC to require permanent disposal. Id,
§ 2(12).
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been converted.48 In general, HLW is distinguished by the particularly
serious biological hazard it represents over extremely long periods of
time (ie., thousands or hundreds of thousands of years). High-level
waste therefore requires special, long-term (effectively permanent)
management.49
Most decommissioning studies assume that, with the exception of
spent fuel, radioactive waste from decommissioning can be disposed of
as low-level waste by shallow land burial.50 One policy study prepared
for the NRC, however, indicates that as much as seventy-four metric
tons of the radioactive reactor components of a single reactor might
require the same kind of deep waste storage that high-level waste
does.5 Deferring dismantlement would not eliminate this requirement
due to the extremely long-lived radioactive isotopes in some of the ma-
terial to be decommissioned. 2
There are, at present, no sites for the permanent storage of high-
level waste. 3 High level waste leakage problems have been reported at
several of the existing temporary storage sites. 4 Thus far, deep under-
ground burial has been considered the most feasible and safest
48. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70408, 70415-16 (1979) for a definition of high-level waste used in
proposed NRC regulations for the licensing of HLW disposal sites.
49. CURA, supra note 10, at 6.
50. Id at 8.
51. R. SMITH, G. KOZEK & W. KENNEDY, JR., 2 TECHNOLOGY, SAFETY AND COSTS OF
DECOMMISSIONING A REFERENCE PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR POWER STATION
NUREG/CR-0130, at G-29 app. (1978) (Report prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory
for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
52. CURA, supra note 10, at 8. Isotopes are atoms which have the same atomic number
(the same number of protons in the nucleus), but different atomic weights (different numbers
of neutrons in the nucleus).
53. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Pub.
L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983), was signed into law on January 7, 1983. The Act is
directed toward the development of repositories for the disposal of high-level waste. The
Act specifically provides a schedule for the nomination of actual waste disposal sites which
allows for repository construction to start by 1989. Id § 112(b)(l), at 96 Stat. 2208-09. The
Act also calls for the Department of Energy to submit a site specific plan by June 1, 1985, for
Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facilities for spent fuel or high-level waste. Id § 141,
at 96 Stat. 2241-44. For an enlightening discussion of the technical and political problems
raised by present geologic disposal alternatives, see Carter, The Radi'aste Paradox, Sci.,
Jan. 7, 1983, at 33.
54. At the Hanford Reserve in Washington State, for example, more than 500,000 gal-
lons of HLW have reportedly leaked from storage tanks. K. SHRADER-FRECHETrE. Nu-
CLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF FISSION
TECHNOLOGY 52 (1980). A number of technical approaches to HLW storage are presently
being discussed, including burial in deep, stable geological formations, burial beneath the
ocean floor, and even ejection into space. P. EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN. stpra
note 8, at 452 (1977).
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alternative.5
Low-level waste has radioactive concentration levels many magni-
tudes lower than high-level waste."6 Low-level waste is produced at
every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and includes materials such as re-
actor pipe systems, contaminated laboratory equipment, and solvents
used to clean surface contamination.5 7 Low-level waste is presently
disposed of by shallow land burial.5
Although considerably less dangerous than high-level waste, low-
level waste is potentially hazardous. The Interagency Review Group
on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG), established by President Carter
in 1978, recognized the problems in dealing with low-level waste ob-
serving that "[t]he heterogeneity of the wastes, the extreme range of
their physical and chemical properties, and their interaction with the
ground . . . after disposal are, at present, sufficiently complex as to
make it difficult to confidently predict their long-term behavior and
their potential hazard."' 9 The IRG report goes on to forecast that, de-
pending on assumptions about nuclear power growth rates, commercial
low-level waste could total 83 to 260 million cubic feet by the year
2000.60 Of this amount, decommissioning could contribute between
100,000 and 200,000 cubic feet of low-level waste by the year 2000.61
Although decommissioning wastes represent only a very small
fraction of total low-level waste, the development of low-level waste
management policy could still affect decommissioning policy. Reactor
decommissioning will be delayed or only partially accomplished if ra-
dioactive waste storage sites are unavailable or inadequate.62
C. Decommissioning and Radiation Exposure
It has been observed that the "failure to properly decommission a
55. CURA, supra note 10, at 9. High-level waste in the form of spent fuel rods is pres-
ently stored at reactor site storage pools. To adequately decommission a reactor, this spent
fuel must first be removed from the site. If adequate offsite storage is not available, how-
ever, reactor decommissioning can take place to only a limited extent. 'Id at 11, 13,
56. Radioactive concentrations of LLW are on the order of one micro-curie-per-cubic-
foot, as compared to thousands of curies-per-cubic-foot (or gallon) for HLW. CURA, supra
note 10, at 11. The NRC defines LLW as waste containing less than 10 micro-curies (NCI)
of transuranic element contaminants per gram of material. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-18,
57. CURA, supra note 10, at 11.
58. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-18.
59. INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE IRG ON Nu-
CLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT 78 (1979).
60. Id at app. D-8.
61. Id
62. CURA, supra note 10, at 13.
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reactor and failure to adequately finance this work will mean health
and safety liability and, in turn, financial liability" for governments.
63
Decommissioning requires that residual radioactivity in the reactor be
reduced to levels considered safe for releasing the site for unrestricted
use.' What constitutes such "safe" levels has historically been a mat-
ter for regulatory determination. Given our incomplete knowledge of
the effects of radiation on health, these levels have been subject to fre-
quent adjustment and are likely to be subject to adjustment in the fu-
ture as well.
65
The levels and composition of radioactivity in the reactor directly
affect all three primary decommissioning strategies. In the case of both
mothballing and entombment, the period of time during which signifi-
cant quantities of radioactivity remain in the decommissioned reactor
determines the length of the licensing period.66 The method and cost of
dismantlement is also affected by the levels and composition of radio-
activity in the reactor.67
An Atomic Industrial Forum study completed for the NRC con-
cluded that it would require approximately 500,000 years before the
radiation in a mothballed or entombed pressurized water reactor would
decay to safe release levels.68 If this estimate is valid, both mothballing
and entombment are arguably unacceptable decommissioning alterna-
tives. In the case of entombment, no structure could be expected to
outlive and contain the radioactivity entombed within it.69 In both al-
ternatives, the idea of establishing a monitoring and surveillance sys-
tem for decommissioned reactors that would last hundreds or
thousands of years is, at the very least, difficult to comprehend.
63. Schwent, State Regulatory Impact on Reactor Decommissioning: Financing Ap-
proaches and Their Cost, in DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FA-
CILImTs 727 (M. Osterhout ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Schwent].
64. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 0-6.
65. See id which states that the "EPA has the formal responsibility for establishing a
residual radioactivity level which is considered safe but is not scheduled to do so until 1984.'
See also infra note 70.
66. This follows from the fact that a site will not be released for unrestricted use until it
no longer poses a health and safety danger to the public. 10 C.F.R. § 50.82 (1982).
67. See supra note 44.
68. The Atomic Industrial Forum is the representative organization of the American
nuclear energy industry. This calculation is based on an assumed maximum allowable beta-
gamma surface dose rate of 0.4 millirem per hour. The contact dose rate from the ra-
dionuclide nickel-59 will require approximately 500,000 years to decay to this level. Hear-
ings 1977,supra note 12, at 131 (statement of H. Glauberman and W. Manion). It has also
been suggested that nickel-59 will continue to emit hazardous levels of radiation for over
one million years. The Cost of Turning it Off, supra note 18, at 17.
69. CURA, supra note 10, at 30.
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Whether the complete decommissioning of a reactor will take 5,
50, 500, 5000 years or longer, will have a tremendous impact on the
regulatory requirements for decommissioning.70
The longer the time frame for reactor decommissioning, and hence
the involvement of regulatory institutions, the greater the probability of
institutional failures.7 In addition, there is the moral dilemma in-
volved in shifting the decommissioning problem to future generations
who did not receive the benefits of the electricity generated by the nu-
clear plants.
An intermediate option between prompt dismantlement and "per-
manent" mothballing or entombment would be to maintain the reactor
in a steady state for up to one hundred years after shutdown to permit
some on-site radioactive decay prior to dismantlement.72 Dismantle-
ment, prompt or delayed, actually transfers the long-term surveillance
problem to the waste storage site. From a regulatory viewpoint, a cen-
tralized waste site may be preferable to a large number of mothballed
or entombed reactors dotting the landscape.
D. The Economic Cost of Decommissioning
The economic cost of decommissioning is, in addition to health
and safety effects, a major concern in evaluating decommissioning pol-
icy. Decommissioning economics are influenced by reactor characteris-
tics, the decommissioning method chosen, waste storage requirements,
and allowable levels of personnel exposure to radiation.73 Estimates of
70. Hearings 1977, supra note 12, at 82-83 (statement of Monte Canfield, Jr.). The cur-
rent trend in radiation standards is toward increased conservatism. Since 1902, when the
first radiation dosage standards for workers were established, the acceptable level of expo-
sure has gone from ten remsper day to five remsperyear, a 750-fold decrease. COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CLEANING UP THE REMAINS Or NUCLEAR
FACILITIES-A MULTIBILLION DOLLAR PROBLEM 22 (1977). If this trend continues, the
standards now used for decommissioning might be considered unsafe in the future. Further
research and experience with decommissioning and the establishment of safe levels of sur-
face radioactivity could tremendously affect estimates for decommissioning timescales.
71. Crofford, Decommissioning Standards, in DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSION-
ING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, 17, 19-20 (M. Osterhout ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Crof-
ford]. For an interesting discussion of reliance on the perennial nature of regulatory
systems, see Strohi, Legal, Administrative and FinancialAspects ofLong Term Management of
Radioactive Waste, 21 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77, 83-85 (1978), which quotes the United States
Environmental Protection Agency as suggesting that it would be imprudent to "plan waste
storage and disposal systems in which the basic elements of safety rely on the performance
of human functions for more than 100 years."
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
73. Estimates for radiation exposures for different reactor types and decommissioning
methods are contained in DGEIS, supra note 28, 0-41 to 44.
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initial costs range from approximately $2.5 million for mothbaUing,74
to $21 million for entombment," to well over $100 million for
dismantlement.7 6
In general, mothballing is estimated as having the lowest initial
cost because it involves the least amount of dismantlement and con-
struction at the reactor site. Its long-term annual costs are the highest,
however, as a result of surveillance and monitoring requirements and
the indefinite time period involved.77 Prompt dismantling has the
highest initial cost, but essentially involves no continuing expenditures
for maintenance of the site, assuming the site is available for un-
restricted use. Cost estimates for entombment fall between those for
dismantlement and mothballing.
A critical assessment of the cost estimates for reactor decommis-
sioning is beyond the scope of this Note. Several important observa-
tions can be made, however, concerning the nature of decommissioning
cost estimates. The dominant thread in all the cost estimates for com-
mercial reactor decommissioning is that of uncertainty. This uncer-
tainty in decommissioning cost estimates is the result of several factors.
The first factor is the lack of any actual experience in decommis-
sioning large commercial reactors. Many cost estimates are at least
partially based on extrapolation from decommissioning experience
with small test reactors.7" Several studies, however, have recognized
the limits of relying on prior decommissioning history.79 There are two
major problems in attempting to extrapolate from such experience.
One is determining the relationship between plant size and cost and the
other is adjusting for the effect of the number of years of plant opera-
tion prior to plant decommissioning. This latter problem arises be-
cause the longer the plant operates, the greater will be the radioactive
buildup and, consequently, the cost of decommissioning.
The second factor is the difficulty of forecasting discount rates, in-
flation rates, labor costs, and other important variables, thirty to forty
years into the future. As decommissioning is very labor intensive, the
cost estimate will, to a large extent, be influenced by the labor rates
chosen in the cost analysis.8 0 These labor rates, of course, vary from
74. Hearings 1977, supra note 12, at 109 (statement of Howard J. Larson).
75. CURA, supra note 10, at 32.
76. CURA, supra note 10, at 31, 84. See DGEIS, supra note 28, at 4-8.
77. CURA, supra note 10, at 32.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 84-91.
79. See, ag., CURA, supra note 10, at 30.
80. See MacDonald, supra note 41, at 695, 698.
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region to region, and from country to country.
The third factor is the uncertainty of waste management require-
ments and standards for acceptable levels of radioactivity. As approxi-
mately twenty-five to thirty percent of the total cost of dismantling will
stem from transportation and disposal of radioactive waste, the stan-
dards ultimately adopted for waste management could have a tremen-
dous impact on total decommissioning costs."' In the case of radiation
standards, inevitable changes in this area could affect the timing and
method of decommissioning and, hence, the cost.
The fourth factor is the varying cost estimates and methodologies
of different studies. This makes detailed comparison virtually
impossible.8z
The regulatory agency or agencies responsible for decommission-
ing in a given locality must mediate the conflict between minimizing
the cost of decommissioning and minimizing the hazards associated
with residual radioactive material. Thus, not only must a method of
decommissioning with its attendant costs be selected, but it must also
be determined how the cost will be borne.3
E. Decommissioning Experience
No large commercial nuclear power plant has ever been decom-
missioned. There have, however, been numerous decommissionings of
small, primarily government-owned, research reactors. In the United
States, for example, sixty-four licensed reactors have been decommis-
sioned, including five nuclear power reactors.8 4 These reactors range in
size from 1 to 260 megawatts (thermal). 5 Test reactors have also been
81. Sefcik, supra note 25, at 70.
82. These observations would tend to suggest that present decommissioning cost esti-
mates may be considerably lower. Although most decommissioning studies suggest that the
cost to decommission a reactor is a small factor in the overall cost of constructing and oper-
ating a nuclear power plant, substantial sums of money are still involved. These projected
costs of decommissioning should be critically evaluated and included in the consideration of
the initial decision whether to build, or complete, a nuclear reactor, See Hearings 1977,
supra note 12, at 56 (statement of Richard Cunningham). Id at 133-34 (statement of H.
Glauberman & W. Manion). But see Swiss Estimate Price of Decommissioning as 20% Cost
of Building Plant, NUCLEONICS WK., Feb. 26, 1981, at 4. For a complete discussion of these
questions, see infra text accompanying notes 295-327.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 295-327 for a discussion of financing
decommissioning.
84. The other 59 reactors include six test reactors, one nuclear ship, and 52 research
reactors. Erickson, United States Licensed Reactor Decommissioning Experience, in DECON-
TAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 337 (M. Osterhout cd. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Erickson].
85. 42 of these reactors have been decommissioned by dismantlement and 10 are either
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decommissioned in France86 and Italy.87
The most frequently cited decommissioning experience involved
the dismantling of the Elk River boiling-water reactor, a small twenty-
two megawatt (electric) reactor located at Elk River, Minnesota. 8 The
AEC dismantled this reactor over a three-year period from 1972-74.19
The total cost to the AEC turned out to be $6.15 million, compared to
$6 million for the plant's construction."
Reactor decommissionings carried out to date, including Elk
River, provide valuable information in assessing the costs and risks of
decommissioning large scale commercial reactors. They have also pro-
vided valuable technical information and experience to aid in future
reactor decommissionings. It must be kept in mind, however, that the
direct extrapolation of experience from small reactor decommission-
ings may be misleading. 91 Thus, even with some limited decommis-
sioning experience available, there is still tremendous uncertainty and
controversy surrounding the issue of future decommissioning of large
commercial nuclear reactors.
F. Premature Reactor Decommissioning
Up to this point, this Note has discussed decommissioning in refer-
ence to reactors which have reached the end of their thirty- to forty-
year projected lifespan. Although this situation is the primary focus of
in the process of being dismantled or planned for dismantlement. Id For a complete dis-
cussion of United States reactor decommissioning experience, see 14; See also Sefcik, supra
note 25, at 65-68.
86. Buclin, Declassement de la Centrale Nucleaire Experimentale de Lucens, in DECOM-
MISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PRECEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 No-
VEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND NEA (OECD) 449 (1979).
87. Agostinelli, Martini, Migliorati, Pizzi, Servo & Rapetti, Demantelemnent Farlel du
React eurAvogadro AS-1, in DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PRECEEDINGS OF
A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND
NEA (OECD) 477 (1979). For a review of worldwide nuclear decommissioning experience
of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including reactors, see Deconmmissioning Frperlence
(Sessions VI and VII), in DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PRECEEDINGS OF A
SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND
NEA (OECD) 433-608 (1979).
88. Sefcik, supra note 25, at 67. For comparison purposes, most recently constructed
and planned commercial nuclear power plants have generating capacities of 800 to 1100
MWe. NUCLEONIC WK., Jan. 28, 1982, at 14.
89. Sefcik, supra note 25, at 67.
90. The Elk River reactor was built in the early 1960's. Id Note that the cost figures
for plant construction and decommissioning are expressed in 1974 dollars. CURA, supra
note 10, at 27. To reduce worker exposure to radiation, reactor components were cut up
under water with the use of remote control plasma torches.
91. Sefcik, supra note 25, at 65.
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this Note, the unique and substantial problems caused by premature
decommissioning resulting from accidents and technical difficulties in
the reactor must be addressed in any analysis of decommissioning
policy.
The accident involving Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear
power plant (TMI-2), on March 29, 1979, has raised serious and as yet
unanswered questions concerning the economics and technology of
decommissioning a reactor following an accident. To begin with, no
final decision has yet been made on the major question of whether the
plant will be decontaminated, repaired and restarted, or decontami-
nated and decommissioned. In either event, the costs are likely to be
very large. Just how large, however, is not known with certainty. Cost
estimates for the clean-up of TMI-2 range from $650 million to $1.3
billion (1981 dollars).92 This dwarfs the utility's original estimate,
made the week following the accident, of a total clean-up cost of $40
million.93 The accident has also pushed the owner and operator of
TMI-2, General Public Utilities, to the brink of bankruptcy. 94 The pos-
sibility of decommissioning necessitated by a reactor accident repre-
sents a serious threat to the advance planning and orderly
accumulation of funds for decommissioning.
95
Postaccident decommissioning is largely neglected in most decom-
missioning studies.96 In addition, while the cost of postaccident decom-
missioning is likely to far exceed that of planned decommissioning,97
most nuclear regulatory systems do not make specific provisions for
postaccident decommissionings. 98
Premature decommissioning may also result from technical and
92. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GREATER COMMITMENT NEEDED
TO SOLVE CONTINUING PROBLEMS AT THREE MILE ISLAND, REP. EMD 81-106, at v (1981)
[hereinafter cited as GAO 1981]. This report concludes that the cost to clean up TMI-2 will
be about the same whether the plant is restored or decommissioned. Id
93. Nuclear Powerplant Shutdown--ho Pays. Hearings Before the Subeonmm. on En-
ergy of the Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1979) (Statement of Gerald
Charnoff).
94. GAO 1981, supra note 92, at i. General Public Utilities is actually the investor-
owned holding company of three operating utility companies, one of which, Metropolitan
Edison (Met. Ed.), was the direct operator of Three Mile Island.
95. See generally CURA, supra note 10, at 39-40. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THREE MILE ISLAND: THE FINANCIAL FALLOUT, REP. EMD 80-89
(1980) for a thorough discussion of the financial implications of reactor accidents.
96. Schwent, supra note 63, at 734-50.
97. Id. For a discussion of proposals for premature shutdown insurance to cover costs
in excess of those projected for planned decommissioning, see infra text accompanying notes
321-326.
98. See von Busekist, supra note 9, at 35.
[Vol. 6
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
economic problems in reactor operation. One such problem, embrittle-
ment, occurs when the steel reactor pressure vessel becomes brittle as a
result of neutron flux taking place in those boiling-water reactors con-
taining copper impurities in the steel.99 Reactors with embrittlement
problems may be forced into early retirement.1t° This could result in
potentially inadequate funds being available for decommissioning be-
cause "the full anticipated reactor life will not be available over which
to collect the necessary monies. ' 101
Premature decommissioning may involve technical and cost con-
siderations not yet completely evaluated. 02 These considerations will,
in turn, have effects on the regulatory framework for decommissioning.
For example, some accidents, including TMI-2, will contaminate the
reactor vessel to such an extent that it becomes quite active, and must
be thoroughly decontaminated before it can be dismantled, thereby ad-
ding both time and expense to the decommissioning process. Though it
may be appropriate in initial analysis of decommissioning to consider
premature reactor decommissioning and planned reactor decommis-
sioning separately, 0 3 any comprehensive regulatory system for reactor
decommissioning must take both into account. This Note will, where
appropriate, highlight special considerations relating to premature
decommissioning, particularly in terms of the financial problems which
they pose.
G. Land Use
A final, and not unimportant, consideration in reactor decommis-
sioning is land use. Although this issue will not be extensively dis-
cussed in this Note, a few observations are appropriate. In all three
major decommissioning methods, commitments of land are required.
Mothballing and entombment leave radioactive equipment at the reac-
tor site and render the site unavailable for public use for an indefinite
period of time (Ze., until the radioactivity has decayed to "safe" levels,
99. Sefcik, supra note 25, at 60.
100. Id. Under present technical and economic conditions, it is unlikely that an embrit-
tled reactor vessel could feasibly be replaced. Id
101. Schwent, State Regulatory Impact on Decommissioning Financial Approaches and
Their Costs, NUCLEAR NEWS, Apr. 1980, at 46, 50. This statement contains the implicit
assumption that some mechanism for collecting decommissioning funds prior to the actual
time of decommissioning will be in place. For a thorough discussion of this concept. see
infra text accompanying notes 290-300.
102. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 0-1.
103. "Planned reactor decommissioning" is used here to mean decommissioning follow-
ing a reactor's expected life.
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as defined by the appropriate regulatory agency). The land commit-
ment estimated for one cancelled nuclear power plant in Wisconsin, for
example, was twelve acres.'14 In the case of prompt reactor dismantle-
ment and, to a lesser extent, entombment and mothballing, off-site land
is also required for radioactive material disposal. This land commit-
ment was estimated at 2.5 acres in the case of prompt dismantlement
of the aforementioned Wisconsin plant. 0 5 The dotting of the land-
scape with entombed or mothballed reactors has been cited as one
reason these two decommissioning methods should be rejected as
unsatisfactory.'°6
IV. DECOMMISSIONING POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Legislative and Regulatory Framework for Decommissioning
Decommissioning policy in the United States involves several fed-
eral and state agencies including the NRC, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Department of
Transportation, at the federal level, and public utility commissions
(PUCs) and state energy offices, at the state level. This section will
focus on the role of the NRC and state PUCs in regulating and financ-
ing decommissioning. The NRC and PUCs are primarily responsible
for answering the questions: 1) How will nuclear reactors be decom-
missioned, 2) who will decommission them, and 3) how will this
decommissioning be financed?
Before moving to a specific discussion of reactor decommissioning
regulation in the United States, it is helpful to consider the basic struc-
ture of domestic nuclear regulation. The responsibility for the civilian
development of nuclear energy was vested in the AEC with the passage
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.107 All nuclear materials and facili-
ties remained under federal government control until the passage of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.108 This Act, which allowed private indus-
try to participate in nuclear power development for the first time, estab-
lished the basic licensing scheme for nuclear facilities that still exists
today.'0 9 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided that "the develop-
104. CURA, supra note 10, at 35.
105. Id
106. See, e.g., id
107. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 24, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), amended by Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
109. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 vested responsibility for both the development and
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ment, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make
the maximum contribution to the general welfare,"' ' ° and that "[tihe
processing and utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear
material must be regulated in the national interest. and to protect
the health and safety of the public."' IIThe overriding concern of the
AEC and, subsequently, the NRC with health and safety has been reit-
erated in their numerous issuances.'" 2 There is no explicit mention of
decommissioning, however, in either the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974."11
A utility seeking to build and operate a nuclear power plant must
apply for a license from the NRC both at the preconstruction and pre-
operation stages.1 4 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the Commis-
sion' s authority to promulgate regulations concerning the contents of a
license application as it "may determine to be necessary to decide such
of the technical and financial qualifications of the applicant, . . . or
any other qualification of the applicant as the Commission may deem
appropriate for the license.""' 6 The NRC also has the authority to
amend licenses by reason of regulatory changes." 7
regulation of nuclear power in a single agency, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2031, 2035, 2051-53 (1957).
This schizophrenic responsibility for both the promotion and regulation of nuclear power
predictably led to conflicts, problems, and the eventual demise of the AEC. For further
discussion of this conflict, see Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble- Is Such a State
Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 697 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]. The En-
ergy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1976), abolished the AEC and split
its functions between two new agencies, the NRC and the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Agency (ERDA).
The NRC assumed the regulatory functions of the old AEC, including responsibility for
the licensing of nuclear reactors, 42 U.S.C. § 5843(b) (1976), and nuclear waste facilities, 42
U.S.C. § 5842 (1976). ERDA assumed the AEC's research and development responsibilities,
42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1976). ERDA's nuclear research and development functions, which in-
cluded responsibility for building and operating nuclear waste repositories, 42 U.S.C. § 5813
(1976), were later transferred to the newly-created Department of Energy, and ERDA was
abolished under the Department of Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp.
1977).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1976).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d) (1976).
112. See, eg., In re Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 4 A.E.C. 214, 216 (1969); In re Maine
Yankee Atomic Power Co., 6 A.E.C. 1003, 1008 (1973). Both cases cite the overriding im-
portance of health and safety considerations in judgments under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976), 43 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. 1 1977).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2232-33, 2235, 2239 (1976).
115. "Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission except where otherwise
noted.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2237 (1976). Original licensing decisions are made by the three member
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), which must hold public hearings prior to its
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1. NRC Regulations
Although reactor decommissioning is not explicitly mentioned in
the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC has promulgated several regulations
that are relevant to the problem. The most important of these regula-
tions are 10 C.F.R. § 50.82 (1982) and 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w) (1983).11 8
Section 50.82 concerns the termination of production and utiliza-
tion facility licenses.119 The section gives the NRC authority to require
that licensees applying to terminate a license supply
information, including information as to proposed procedures for the
disposal of radioactive material, decontamination of the site, and
other procedures, to provide reasonable assurance that the disman-
tling of the facility and disposal of the component parts will be per-
formed in accordance with the regulations in this chapter and will
not be inimical to the . . . health and safety of the public.'
20
Section 50.82 goes on to say that if the licensee meets the foregoing
requirements, the NRC may authorize dismantling and disposal of the
facility and provide for license termination upon the completion of pro-
cedures that accord with NRC conditions.
1 2
decision on construction permits. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976); see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.401
(1982). The same basic procedure is followed in issuing an operating license, except that a
public hearing is not required unless requested by a party or intervenor. 42 U.SC. § 2239
(1976). The ASLB's decision may be appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board and subsequently to the Commission itself. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.714, 2.721, 2.786, 2,787
(1980). The Commission's final decision may then be appealed to the United States court of
appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976). The application of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 (1976), to the NRC is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976).
118. At the same time the NRC promulgated 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w) in 1982, the Commis-
sion amended 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f) to eliminate the financial qualification review require-
ments for electric utilities applying for nuclear power plant construction permits or
operating licenses. 47 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1982). Prior to this time, § 50,33(1) required appli-
cants for operating licenses to show they had funds or reasonable assurance of obtaining
funds to cover the estimated costs of reactor operation plus "the estimated cost of perma-
nently shutting the facility down and maintaining it is a safe condition." 10 C.F.R, 50,33()
(1980). The section also required applicants to show at the construction permit stage of
licensing, that they had the funds or a reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds to cover
construction and related fuel cycle costs. Id. For a discussion of the financial qualifications
requirement and its demise, see infra text accompanying notes 201-14,
119. 10 C.F.R. § 50.82 (1982).
120. Id.
121. The entire text of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82 (1982) provides that:
(a) Any licensee may apply to the Commission for authority to surrender a
license voluntarily and to dismantle the facility and dispose of its component parts.
The Commission may require information, including information as to proposed
procedures for the disposal of radioactive material, decontamination of the site,
and other procedures, to provide reasonable assurance that the dismantling of the
facility and disposal of the component parts will be performed in accordance with
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Section 50.82 does not use the term "decommissioning." It does,
however, introduce a specific method of decommissioning--dismantle-
ment. Section 50.82 also speaks in terms of what information the NRC
may require in terminating a license, seemingly leaving it up to the
Commission as to what information to require in any given case for
termination of a license. Perhaps most significantly, section 50.82 de-
fers any detailed consideration of decommissioning until the end of the
nuclear plant's life, when application is made for operating license
termination.
Ten C.F.R. section 50.54(w)(1983), promulgated by the NRC in
1982, requires nuclear reactor licensees to maintain the maximum
amount of commercially available on-site property damage insurance
to cover damages resulting from a reactor accident, or show an
equivalent amount of protection."2 Licensees must report annually to
the NRC as to the source and amount of their insurance coverage.'
t 3
This new property damage insurance requirement is to be distin-
guished from the Price Anderson Act, which limits utility liability for
damage to persons as a result of nuclear accidents.1
2 4
The Commission's concern in enacting the decontamination insur-
ance requirement was to protect the public health and safety by requir-
ing insurance to cover the reasonable decontamination and cleanup
costs associated with the property damage resulting from a reactor acci-
dent.2 5 This is certainly a laudable objective and the NRC's promul-
gation of this regulation is definitely a step in the right direction.
the regulations in this chapter and will not be inimical to the common defense and
security or to the health and safety of the public.
(b) If the application demonstrates that the dismantling of the facility and
disposal of the component parts will be performed in accordance with the regula-
tions in this chapter and will not be inimical to the common defense and security or
to the health and safety of the public, and after notice to interested persons, the
Commission may issue an order authorizing such dismantling and disposal, and
providing for the termination of the license upon completion of such procedures in
accordance with any conditions specified in the order.
122. The text of 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w) provides in relevant part:
(w) Each electric utility licensee under this part for a production or utilization fa-
cility of the type described in § 50.21(b) or § 50.22 shall, by June 29, 1982, take
reasonable steps to obtain on-site property damage insurance available at reason-
able costs and on reasonable terms from private sources or to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Commission that it possesses an equivalent amount of protection
covering the facility.
123. 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w)(4) (1983).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
125. 47 Fed. Reg. 13752 (1982).
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Several limitations of section 50.54(w)'s decontamination insurance re-
quirement must, however, be noted.
The most important limitation is that coverage currently available,
ranging from $375 to $450 million, 12 6 is grossly inadequate to cover
accidents of the magnitude of TMI-2. Cost estimates for the decontam-
ination of TMI-2 range from $650 million to $1.3 billion.
12 7
The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island
estimated the total financial cost of the accident at $1 to $2 billion, even
if TMI-2 is put back into operation. 128 At the same time, the operator
of TMI, Metropolitan Edison, had "only" $300 million of property in-
surance, the maximum it was able to obtain. 29 The accident has left
Metropolitan Edison and its parent company, General Public Utilities,
on the verge of bankruptcy. 30
Additionally, while the decontamination insurance requirement
does at least partially addresss property damage expenses, it does not
cover the utility's replacement power costs; the cost of buying power
from another utility until the damaged nuclear power plant is either
repaired or replaced. Such costs can be quite substantial.13 Although
some effort is being made to insure for the added expense of replace-
ment power, insurance currently available only covers a small percent-
age of replacement power Costs. 132 Finally, the property damage
insurance requirement of section 50.54(w) is directed at the decontami-
nation and general cleanup of accident damaged reactors. It does not
cover the decommissioning of the damaged reactor once it has been
decontaminated, nor does it appear to provide for decommissioning re-
actors forced into early retirement for non-accident related reasons.
In addition to these two sections, the regulations contain several
126. Id. Premiums for such coverage are on the order of $3 million per year for a typical
two-unit site. This, of course, is an additional cost of supplying nuclear-generated electricity
which must be paid for by the ratepayers.
127. See supra text accompanying note 92.
128. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N. ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED
FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 9 (1979).
129. GAO 1981, supra note 92, at vii. For discussion of the use of insurance as a means
of financing accident-related decommissioning, see infra text accompanying notes 324-26,
130. See Dim Bailout Hopesfor General Public Utilities, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1981, at 43,
One of the major added costs to the utility, aside from cleanup expenses, is for replacement
power now that neither TMI- I nor TMI-2 is operating. For an excellent discussion of the
problem, see Kimball, Insurancefor Replacement Power Costs, in SuBcoMM. ON NUCLEAR
REGULATION FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH
CONG. 2D SEss., NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND RECOVERY AT THREE MILE ISLAND: A SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION 357-68 (Comm. Print 1980).
131. See Kimball, supra note 130, at 357-68.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 321-22.
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other requirements pertinent to decommissioning. Ten C.F.R.
§ 50.71(b) (1980) requires that annual financial reports be submitted to
the NRC.
Ten C.F.R. § 51.5(a) (1982) distinguishes between actions requir-
ing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 33 and actions which
may require an EIS, depending on the circumstances. 34 This subsec-
tion goes on to state that actions which may require an EIS include
"[1license amendments or orders authorizing the dismantling or decom-
missioning of nuclear power reactors, testing facilities, fuel reproces-
sing plants and isotopic enrichment plants."' 35 As this subsection is
phrased, if an EIS is to be required, it will be prepared immediately
prior to the order authorizing decommissioning.' 36 To date, no EIS has
been required for an individual reactor decommissioning.
37
The NRC must include consideration of the environmental and
economic costs of decommissioning as part of its cost-benefit analysis
prior to licensing a nuclear power plant.' 38 There are, however, no spe-
133. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5(a) (1982).
134. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5(b) (1983). The need for an EIS under this subsection is to be deter-
mined in accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines at 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.6 (1982).
135. 10 C.F.R. § 51.5(b)(7) (1982). This subsection represents the first time that the NRC
regulations specifically refer to reactor "decommissioning."
136. For additional discussion of the application of the National Environmental Protec-
tion Act (NEPA) to decommissioning, see infra text accompanying notes 164-68.
137. A. SCHILLING, H. LIPPEK, P. TEGELER & J. EASTERLING, DEcOMMstIsSIONING COM-
MERCIAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT REGULATIONS 2-
17, NUREG/CR-0671 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A. SCHILLING]. The strongest treatment
of decommissioning in the regulations appears in 10 C.F.R. § 50. app. F (1982). Its scope.
however, is limited to the decommissioning of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The regula-
tion makes facilitation of decommissioning an objective in the design and site selection of a
reprocessing facility. In addition, it directly confronts the question of the removal and dis-
posal of radioactive waste and provides for public comment prior to taking action to decom-
mission a reprocessing plant. Id
138. 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.25(c), 51.26(a) (1982). In the recent case of Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.). cer.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 443 (1982), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held the "Table S-3 Rules" invalid for failing to allow for proper consideration of the uncer-
tainties surrounding the long-term isolation of high-level radioactive wastes and for failing
to allow for proper consideration of health, socioeconomic, and cumulative effects of fuel
cycle activities. The Table S-3 rules, 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.20(e), 51.23(c) (1982), promulgated by
the NRC to be included in the environmental impact statement of each proposed light water
reactor, is thereby substituted for repeated individualized consideration of the environmen-
tal impact of waste disposal activities, including values for radioactive effluents emitted from
decommissioned plants. The court, in specifically considering the decommissioning values,
stated:
We must assume, therefore, that licensing boards will use Table S-3's values attrib-
utable to decommissioning only if they are assured that the decommissioning
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cific guidelines as to what information concerning decommissioning an
applicant must supply, nor are any particular methods of decommis-
sioning prescribed.
39
In addition to the specific regulations concerning decommission-
ing, the NRC has issued regulatory guides on decommissioning since
the early 1960's.'4 ° Regulatory guides, while not carrying the
mandatory authority of regulations, represent the NRC staff's ideas of
acceptable methods for compliance with regulations. In 1974, the NRC
issued Regulatory Guide 1.86, "Termination of Operating Licenses for
Nuclear Reactors," interpreting 10 C.F.R. § 50.82. t" This short five-
page guide lists mothballing, entombment, dismantlement, and conver-
sion to a new nuclear or fossil fuel plant as acceptable decommission-
ing alternatives.' 42  The guide neither specifies a preferred mode of
decommissioning, nor lays out a timetable for decommissioning a reac-
tor. The guide outlines steps for a licensee to follow in converting an
operating license to a possession-only license. 143 The guide also con-
tains a chart specifying acceptable surface contamination levels, but
does not discuss hazards associated with induced radiation in activated
metals and concrete. 44
Although Regulatory Guide 1.86 has been characterized as
method assumed by the Table is reasonably likely to be the method used for the
individual reactor under consideration. If not, we assume that the licensing board
[at the time of initial plant licensing] will be free to consider the full environmental
costs of whatever decontamination and decommissioning method is expected to be
used.
Id. at 493. The court went on to hold that the NRC's conclusion that Table S-3's values are
economically feasible was not arbitrary and capricious. Id at 490.
139. See In re Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 9 N.R.C. 291, 313 (1979).
140. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, PLAN FOR REEVALUATION or
NRC POLICY ON DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 7, NUREG-0436 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as PLAN FOR REEVALUATION].
141. AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, supra note 27.
142. Id. at B-2.
143. Id The duration of a license and its renewal is controlled by 10 C.FR. § 50,51
(1982). Operating licenses are issued for a specified duration, but in no case for longer than
40 years. The sections applying to license amendments are 10 C.R. §§ 50,90 and 50,91
(1982); neither of them are specifically cited in AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, stpra note 27. There
is no specific reference to a "possession-only" license. These regulations provide, in relevant
part, that a licensee desiring to amend his license must file an amendment with the NRC
describing the desired changes, following, as far as possible, the form for original license
applications. 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.90, 50.91 (1982).
144. AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, supra note 27, at B-5, Table 1. At least one state, California
(as represented by its Department of Health), has argued that states have the right to set
release levels for residual radioactive contamination that are more stringent than federal
standards. This raises the possibility that a state could end up with jurisdiction over a
decommissioned facility that the NRC has determined to be "safe enough" for release for
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"flawed as a regulatory document," containing numerous definitional
problems, it may have considerable de facto effect on the NRC's
decommissioning actions.1 45
Current NRC regulations affecting decommissioning may be sum-
marized by noting: 1) that the NRC oversight of decommissioning is
not explicitly required by statute; 4 6 2) that the NRC currently ap-
proaches decommissioning on a case-by-case basis; 4 7 3) that there are
no firm regulations concerning when and how to decommission a reac-
tor, and 4) that the decommissioning procedures that may be specified
by the NRC are limited to the physical steps in the decontamination
and dismantling of a facility. Advanced planning and financing of
decommissioning are not specifically addressed. In other words, the
NRC does not require that bonds or funds be established at the operat-
ing license stage or that any particular decommissioning plan be re-
quired as a condition precedent to an operating license.
2. Current Trends in the NRC: Reevaluating
Decommissioning Policy
Although, according to the NRC, decommissioning is routinely
considered in the licensing process, and "[t]o a limited extent, the staff
presently examines various decommissioning plans, costs and environ-
mental impacts prior to the issuance of an operating license,"' 4 a re-
view of past nuclear power plant EISs found that decommissioning was
given very limited treatment.' 49 The NRC is currently involved in a
comprehensive reevaluation of its decommissioning policy.' 0 A sub-
stantial part of this reevaluation involves the development of regula-
tions to govern nuclear power plant decommissioning.
New rulemaking for the promulgation of decommissioning regula-
unrestricted use. SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES', RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CALIFORNIA
V-30 (Draft Report 1978) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES'].
145. A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 2-34.
146. Ad hoc decisions by regulatory authorities may create planning problems for the
licensee, particularly in terms of financing decommissioning. This ad hoc procedure works
against one of the important rationales underlying regulatory systems-that of ensuring reli-
able criteria by which licensees may plan their actions. See von Busekist, supra note 9, at 33.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
148. PLAN FOR REEVALUATION, supra note 140, at 7.
149. CURA, supra note 10, at 48.
150. See PLAN FOR REEVALUATION, supra note 140, at 1. The general purpose of the
plan is to assure that the NRC: "(1) develops a general decommissioning policy, (2) devel-
ops the attendant changes for regulations, (3) develops the detailed information needed for
use in licensing decisions for decommissioning, and (4) establishes guidance for facilitation
of decommissioning." Id
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tions was requested in 1977 by the Public Interest Research Group and
others.' The petitioners requested regulations that would require
plant operators to post bonds prior to the plant's operation, which
would be held in escrow, to ensure the availability of funds for decom-
missioning.152 The regulations would also be applied to nuclear power
plants already in operation.
153
On March 13, 1978, the NRC published an "Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking" for the establishment of decommissioning cri-
teria for nuclear facilities, including reactors. 154 The Commission also
determined that new decommissioning regulations would constitute a
major Federal action significantly affecting environmental quality and
ordered the preparation of an EIS under section 102(2)(c) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
t 55
In its reevaluation of decommissioning policy, the NRC has
funded studies relating to the technology, safety, and costs of reactor
decommissioning, 5 6 and has solicited states' views on decommission-
ing policy. 57 Data from these and other NRC funded efforts were in-
corporated in the Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement on
Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (DGEIS).1
58
The DGEIS makes some important statements reflecting the pres-
ent state of thinking at the NRC regarding decommissioning. The
NRC maintains its policy that decommissioning responsibility belongs
to the licensee, subject to NRC regulations. 159 The DGEIS also notes
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id
153. Id The petitioners reasoned that such regulations would ensure that decommission-
ing be paid for by those benefitting from the electricity generated by the particular nuclear
power plant and not be the responsibility of future generations. Id
154. 43 Fed. Reg. 10370 (1978).
155. Id at 10371.
156. See, e.g., R. SMITH, G. KOZEK : W. KENNEDY, JR., upra note 51; H. OAK, G.
HALTER, W. KENNEDY, JR. & G. KOZEK, TECHNOLOGY, SAFETY AND COSTS OF DECOM-
MISSIONING A REFERENCE BOILING WATER REACTOR POWER STATION, NUREG/CR-0672
(1980) (Report prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission).
157. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, STATE WORKSHOPS FOR REVIEW OF THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S DECOMMISSIONING POLICY, NUREG/CP-0008
(1979).
158. DGEIS, supra note 28. The DGEIS includes consideration of the decommissioning
of several types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including pressurized and boiling water reac-
tors. The DGEIS is "generic" because it considers the environmental impacts of decommis-
sioning in general, rather than the impacts of specific decommissioning operations. Id
159. Id at 1-3. New decommissioning regulations have not yet been proposed, although
draft regulations are expected to be issued in late 1983. Personal Communication with Dr.
Carl Feldman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Dec. 1982).
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that assuring that adequate funds are available at the time of decom-
missioning is an important aspect of the overall NRC objective of pro-
tecting the public's health and safety.16 The DGEIS concludes that
"[plresent regulatory guidance is not specific enough on required
particulars needed to deal properly with financial assurance
consideration." 16'
The DGEIS lists prompt dismantlement and dismantlement fol-
lowing thirty years of mothballing as reasonable methods of decom-
missioning.' 62  Prompt dismantlement, however, is considered the
preferred alternative in most instances as it would release the facility
and site for unrestricted use in a much shorter period of time than
either entombment or mothballing.1
63
B. Related Legislation and Regulations
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
As discussed earlier, the NRC regulations leave considerable un-
certainty as to whether an Environmental Impact Statement is required
prior to reactor decommissioning.'" Decommissioning has been given
very limited treatment in the preparation of an EIS at the time of plant
licensing.
65
Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 provides that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall...
include in. . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible offi-
160. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 0-8.
161. Id
162. Id at 0-12, 0-16. Dismantlement is referred to as DECON, entombment as EN-
TOMB, and mothballing as SAFSTOR, in the DGEIS. Id at 2-4, 2-5.
163. Id at 0-39. The three general conclusions of the DGEIS are that:
(1) The technology for decommissioning nuclear facilities is well in hand.
Decommissioning.. . can be performed safely and at reasonable cost.
(2) Decommissioning. . . is not an imminent health and safety problem. How-
ever, planning for decommissioning as an integral activity prior to commissioning
[plant start-up] is a critical item that can impact on health and safety as well as
cost.
(3) Decommissioning. . . generally has a positive environmental impact, [rela-
tive to simply abandoning the plant].
Id
164. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39 and note 149. At the same time it has
been observed that "[a]lthough not required in 10 CFR or in the NRC regulatory guides,
consideration of decommissioning has become standard informal procedure in the EIS ac-
companying the initial license application." A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 2-45. 2-46.
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cial on. . . the environmental impact of the proposed action.' 66 This
section has been the subject of vast amounts of litigation since its enact-
ment, with disputes generally focusing on whether something consti-
tutes "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," as well as the timing and contents of EISs,
167
In the landmark case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals held the NEPA applicable to AEC licensing ac-
tions. 168 However, what must be included in a particular EIS for a
nuclear plant has not always been clear, particularly with reference to
the back end of the fuel cycle, that is, radioactive waste.1
69
2. Radiation Standards' 70
Standards setting permissible levels of radiation exposure could
affect the timing, mode, and cost of decommissioning.' 17 1 Occupational
radiation exposure at the reactor site is controlled by 10 C.F.R. part 20,
"Standards for Protection Against Radiation." NRC regulations gov-
erning the termination of licenses provide that these standards will ap-
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1977).
167. See, e.g., Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973), (in considering what constitutes a "significant effect on the human environment,"
the court looked at both the relative increase in environmental impacts and the absolute,
quantitative impacts of the federal action); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.
D.C. 1976) (EIS must include sufficient discussion of alternatives and mitigation measures to
allow a reasoned decision); Green County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n,, 455
F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (permitting or licensing action by
federal agency may constitute major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (mere contemplation of
action by agency is not sufficient to trigger the EIS requirement).
168. 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Judge Wright, writing for the court of ap-
peals, noted that "NEPA was meant to do more than regulate the flow of papers in the
federal beauracracy." Id at 1117. "[I]t compels a case-by-case examination and balancing
of discrete factors." Id at 1122.
169. It is now clear, however, that the EIS during licensing must extend to an evaluation
of the environmencal impacts of radioactive waste generated by the reactor. 10 C.F.R.
§ 51.20(e) (1982). For a critique of this rule, see Linker, Beers & Lash, Radioactive Waste.-
Gaps in the Regulatory System, 56 DEN. L.J. 1, 18-23 (1979).
170. Radiation refers to the emission of energy through material. Damage to body cells
contacted by radiation may produce cell death or mutations. For a good introduction to
radiation and its effects, see SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES', supra note 144, at app. D; See
also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF ExPOSURE TO
Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: 1980 (1980).
171. More stringent radiation standards might prolong the time required before an en-
tombed or mothballed reactor could be released for unrestricted use, as well as affect the
timing and cost of dismantlement.
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ply to decontamination and dismantling.1 72 When all radioactive
material above allowable release limits is removed from the site and
the NRC terminates the license, occupational safety and health are no
longer within the NRC's jurisdiction.
1 73
Until 1977, the NRC was also responsible for setting air quality
standards and emission levels for, and requirements for the control of,
radiation emissions. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, how-
ever, transferred these responsibilities from the NRC to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).174
The EPA now has responsibility for establishing the criteria for
residual radioactivity limits considered safe for decommissioning a nu-
clear facility and releasing it for unrestricted access, but has not yet set
these criteria and is not scheduled to do so until 1984.1,1 The DGEIS
concluded that existing NRC and EPA regulations are not specific
enough to assure the protection of public health and safety. Logically,
the EPA's standards should precede the promulgation of new decom-
missioning regulations by the NRC. 176
At present, NRC guidelines for decommissioning apply only to
surface contamination. 177 Induced radiation, found deep inside steel or
concrete in the reactor, is not covered by any regulation setting limits
for radiation levels prior to unrestricted release of the reactor site. t1 8
172. 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a) (1982). See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
173. A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 3-8. Occupational health and safety at the site
would then fall under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) or corresponding state agencies. Id
174. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (Supp. IV 1980). As radioactive emissions are considered air pol-
lutants under the Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. IV 1980), the states
may set more, though not less, stringent standards than the EPA for radioactive emissions.
The law, therefore, overrides the decision in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), a.fd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See infra text accompanying
notes 277-82 for further discussion of this case.
Prior to the Clean Air Act Amendments, the 1970 President's Reorganization Plan, No.
3, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970) (codified at 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1970)), directed the EPA Adminis-
trator to advise the President with respect to radiation matters affecting health, and to pro-
vide guidance to all federal agencies formulating radiation standards.
175. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-9. For technical discussion of radiation standards for
decommissioning, see DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-9 to 2-15.
176. This may not happen, given the NRC's goal of issuing draft regulations in late 1983.
See supra note 159. For a discussion of the progression of nuclear regulations and radiation
standards in the context of high-level waste disposal, see Hart & Glaser, A Failure to Enact:
A Review of Radioactive Waste Issues and Legislation Considered by the Niney-Sixth Con-
gress, 32 S.C.L. Rev. 639, 691 (1981).
177. AEC REG. GUIDE 1.86, supra note 27, at B-5, Table I.
178. Induced radiation may eventually migrate out of the materials in which it is buried,
posing a possible public health hazard. SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES', supra note 144, at v-
19, 20.
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Radiation standards for the unrestricted release of decommissioned re-
actor sites are, in sum, still up in the air.
3. The Price-Anderson Act and Decommissioning
An early roadblock to the development of commercial nuclear
power was the inability of the nuclear industry to obtain adequate third
party liability insurance.1 79 This situation led to the passage of the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957.180 The Act limits combined government
and industry liability for individual nuclear accidents, called "inci-
dents" in the Act, to a maximum dollar amount, presently $560 million
per incident.'
8 1
The Act currently applies to licensed commercial reactors among
other types of nuclear facilities. 82 Because a nuclear reactor will still
be licensed while a plant is being decommissioned after shutdown, t83 a
nuclear accident at a plant being decommissioned during this time
would be covered by the Price-Anderson Act's limit on third party
liability.
184
4. Transport of Radioactive Waste
The transport of radioactive materials, including spent fuel and
radioactive reactor wastes, is regulated pursuant to the Hazardous
Materials Transport Act of 1975.'11 This Act gives the United States
Department of Transportation primary federal authority to regulate all
modes of transport in interstate commerce of hazardous materials, in-
cluding radioactive waste. The NRC regulates the packaging of nu-
clear materials, including waste, for transport.
8 6
179. GAO 1981, supra note 92, at vi.
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(i), 2014, 2210 (1973).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1973). A nuclear incident is defined as: "any occurrence ...
causing. . . bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or
loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or
other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or by-product material," 42 U.S,C.
§ 2014(q) (1973).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1976).
183. See supra note 143 and accompanying text for discussion of license amendment to
"possession-only" status.
184. There has also been discussion of extending the Act to cover high level waste facili-
ties, The Price-Anderson Act May be Extended to High Level Waste Facilities, NUCLEONICS
WK., Oct. 8, 1981, at 4.
185. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-12 (1976).
186. 10 C.F.R. § 71 (1982). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 38690 (1979) (memorandum of under-
standing between the Department of Transportation and the NRC concerning transport of
radioactive materials).
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A report prepared as part of the NRC's reevaluation of its decom-
missioning policy has noted, however, "that existing transportation reg-
ulations may not adequately address the problems that would arise in
trying to package and ship the large quantity of 'radioactive rubble'
which would result from the dismantlement of a large commercial nu-
clear facility." 87
5. Uranium Mill Decommissioning
The first steps in the nuclear fuel cycle involve the mining and
processing, or milling, of uranium ore. The milling process generates
substantial radioactive waste, called "tailings." Although tailings are
less radioactive than wastes produced at the back-end of the nuclear
fuel cycle, they still pose a potential public health hazard.'
In several western states, uranium mill operators have abandoned
inactive mills, leaving tons of tailings which have escaped into surface
water or into the atmosphere. 8 9 In some instances, tailings have even
been used to construct houses.' 90
To avoid recurrence of this dangerous uranium mill abandonment
problem, Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Con-
trol Act of 1978. 91 The Act provides that as part of the license applica-
tion for a uranium mill, a decommissioning plan and proof of financial
ability to execute the plan must be provided to the NRC.192 This Act,
thus, sets a precedent for consideration of nuclear facility decommis-
sioning during the licensing process.
187. A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 3-16, 3-17. See also New York v. United States
Dep't. of Transp., 539 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) in which Judge Abraham Sofaer
overturned a federal rule, scheduled to take effect Feb. 1, 1982, 46 Fed. Reg. 5698 (1981),
which would have permitted the shipment by road throughout the nation of all radioactive
materials. The court invalidated the rule as arbitrary and capricious because Dor's Envi-
ronmental Assessment failed to consider the 'worst-case scenario' and failed to study appro-
priate alternatives. Id at 1241-42. The rule would have overridden local ordinances
prohibiting large shipments of radioactive materials through densely-populated areas. Id at
1241. The ultimate effect that this ruling will have on the transport of radioactive waste,
including decommissioning waste, is not presently clear.
188. CURA, supra note 10, at 2-3.
189. Id
190. Id See also Linker, Beers & Lash, supra note 169, at 3-4.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 7901 (1981).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2113, 2201(x) (1980). 10 C.F.R. pt. 40, app. A. In the House Report
accompanying the bill, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs said that the bill "rein-
forces the NRC's authority to make financial arrangements with uranium milling companies
to insure proper stabilization and care of uranium mill tailings." H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess. 20, quoted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7433, 7442.
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6. Reprocessing Plant Decommissioning
Only one commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant has ever op-
erated in this country. That plant, operated by Nuclear Fuel Services,
Inc. in West Valley, New York was permanently closed in 1976, but
has not yet been recommissioned. 93 Because large quantities of in-
duced radiation and surface contamination accumulate in reprocessing
facilities, they present decommissioning problems of a similar magni-
tude to nuclear reactors.'
94
In 1980 Congress enacted the West Valley Demonstration Project
Act, which provides for the disposal of HLW and decommissioning of
the facility. 95 The Act directs the United States Department of Energy
to decontaminate and decommission the plant in accordance with NRC
regulations. 9 6 The decommissioning of this plant has not yet taken
place, but the situation illustrates the problems in trying to plan for the
decommissioning of a nuclear facility on a case-by-case basis. Decom-
missioning for the West Valley Plant is expected to cost as much as
$600 million and take fourteen years. 197 Both the situation at West
Valley and the uranium mill tailings problem illustrate the need for
advanced planning for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
7. Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Low-Level radioactive waste, which includes most decommission-
ing waste, can pose significant health and safety problems if not dis-
posed of properly. 98 In 1980, Congress enacted the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, establishing a federal policy that each
state is responsible for providing the capacity, within or outside that
state, for low level radioactive waste disposal in accordance with NRC
regulations. 99 This Act places in the states' hands the responsibility
for seeing to it that space is available for LLW, including low-level
decommissioning waste generated within its borders."°
193. CURA, supra note 10, at 3-4.
194. Id at 4.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (Supp. 1981).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(5) (Supp. 1981).
197. Linker, Beers & Lash, supra note 169, at 8.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (Supp. 1981). Waste generated by defense or federal research
and development programs is excepted from this requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(b) (Supp.
V 1981).
200. For a good historical review of federal nuclear waste management policy, and the
lack thereof, see Hart & Glaser, supra note 176, at 658-77.
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C. Decommissioning and the Demise of the Financial Qualifications
Requirement
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gives the NRC authority to re-
quire from a license applicant information that it determines to be nec-
essary in assessing that applicant's technical and financial
qualifications. °" The legislative history of this section is silent as to the
purpose and scope of this showing of financial qualifications. 2
Under this legislative authority, the NRC promulgated 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.33(f) (1982). Prior to 1982, the section required that an applicant
for an operating license provide information to show that he has suffi-
cient funds or a "reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds," both to
operate the plant for up to five years and to shut down the plant and
maintain it in a safe condition.0 3 The regulation, though requiring
some proof of financial assurance for shutting down a plant, did not
specifically indicate any required information or financial parameters.
This regulation, if in fact it applied to all steps in decommissioning a
nuclear reactor, left the NRC with near total discretion, on a case-by-
case basis, as to the type of financial information it would require.2
Appendix C of 10 C.F.R., Part 50 (now removed from the regula-
tions) 205 made it quite clear that a minimum amount of financial infor-
mation will be required.2°6
Accurately predicting the financial condition of a utility thirty to
forty years from the time of licensing may be impossible. This, coupled
with the uncertainty in present estimates of reactor decommissioning
costs, 20 7 strongly suggests that although financial information require-
ments may help assure adequate decommissioning, the real focus
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1976). Section 2232(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
[e]ach application for a license hereunder shall be in writing and shall specifically
state such information as the Commission, by rule or regulation, may determine to
be necessary to decide such of the technical andflnancialqualiications of the appli-
cant... or any other qualifications of the applicant as the Commission may deem
appropriate for the license (emphasis added).
See also supra text accompanying note 116.
202. S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3456, 3475.
203. Decommissioning financial assurance was not considered at the construction permit
stage, but only at the operating license stage. 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(0 (1982).
204. See supra note 118 for discussion of this regulation.
205. 43 Fed. Reg. 13755 (1982).
206. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, app. C (1982) stated that "the kind and depth of information de-
scribed in this guide is not intended to be a rigid and absolute requirement in determining
an applicant's financial qualifications, the Commission will require the minimum amount of
information necessary for that purpose."
207. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
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should be on establishing actual financing mechanisms for generating
funds to pay for decommissioning. 0 8
In 1982, however, the NRC amended 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f) to re-
move the financial qualifications requirement for electrical utilities ap-
plying for construction permits and operating licenses for nuclear
power plants. °9 In doing so, the Commission affirmed its belief that
the financial qualifications review had done little to identify significant
health and safety concerns at nuclear power plants.2t0 The NRC ar-
gued that its inspection and enforcement activities provide more effec-
tive protection of public health and safety than had the financial
qualifications review."' The NRC action in eliminating this review
was also clearly motivated by a desire to streamline the licensing pro-
cess for the benefit of both license applicants and the Commission
itself.2"
2
In amending 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f) to eliminate the financial qualifi-
cations review for electric utilities, the NRC also eliminated any con-
sideration of decommissioning funding. In doing so, the NRC
acknowledged the importance of decommissioning funding to public
health and safety, but felt the issue was best dealt with in the context of
the Commission's current generic rulemaking on decommissioning." 3
208. See infra notes 290-326 and accompanying text for a discussion of different financ-
ing criteria and options.
209. 47 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1983).
210. Id. Supporters of the financial qualifications review had argued:
1) a utility's financial solvency and ability to finance a nuclear plant impact
health and safety concerns;
2) a utility's inability to recover all costs associated with the plant provides
an incentive for utilities to skimp on important safety components and quality as-
surance standards;
3) the NRC's inspection capabilities and efforts are inadequate to provide a
sufficient assurance of safety, and the financial qualifications review is a necessary
supplement; and
4) financial qualifications review is required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2232(a), (c) and
(d).
Id. at 13750-51.
In response to this final argument, the NRC claims that 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) indicates
the financial qualification review is within the Commission's discretion, but is not mandated,
Id. at 13751. In fact, the language of § 2232(a) would appear to indicate that the financial
qualifications review itself is required, but that the content of that review is within the Com-
mission's discretion. See supra note 201. Unfortunately, the legislative history does not in-
dicate the purpose and scope of the financial qualifications provision. See stjora text
accompanying note 202.
211. 47 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1982).
212. Id. at 13751, 13753 (1982).
213. Id. at 13751 (1982). For a complete discussion of the NRC's generic rulemaking for
decommissioning, see supra text accompanying notes 148-63.
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Unfortunately, the NRC has not yet even offered proposed regulations
for nuclear power plant decommissioning, thereby creating a regula-
tory gap in this area.
The NRC still retains residual authority under 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a)
to require such additional information in individual cases as the Com-
mission deems necessary for a determination on the granting, denial,
modification, or revocation of a license.21 4 Given the NRC's apparent
lack of interest in reviewing a license applicant's financial qualifica-
tions, however, it is difficult to imagine when the NRC, at least under
its present leadership, would require utility financial data. In sum, the
NRC's elimination of the financial qualifications review seems to be a
clear signal that this issue is within the province of state regulatory
bodies, as it does not, in the NRC's opinion, impact upon the public
health and safety.
Even before the demise of the financial qualifications requirement,
several administrative cases before the Commission and one case in the
federal court of appeals,21 5 had indicated the NRC's unwillingness to
vigorously pursue this requirement and the courts' deference to the
Commission's judgment.2" 6
In In re Public Service Company of Newiv Hampshire,217 intervenors
challenged the issuance of permits for the construction of Seabrook
Units 1 and 2, citing the utility's lack of financial qualifications, among
other grounds, to support their arguments for refusing the permit. The
Licensing Board rejected the intervenors' claims and found the utility's
financial qualifications adequate, stating, "Under the Commission's
regulations, a construction permit applicant need not show that it has
the funds in hand to build its proposed plant but only that it has 'rea-
sonable assurance' of obtaining those funds." 218 The Board went on to
214. 47 Fed. Reg. 13752 (1982). See also 10 C.F.R. § 2.758 (1983) which allows the NRC
to require the submission of financial information from a utility if special circumstances are
shown pursuant to this section.
215. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. United States Nucl~ar Regulatory
Comm'n., 582 F.2d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1978).
216. § 50.33(f) 10 C.F.R., prior to 1982, provided that decommissioning financial assur-
ance had to be considered at the operating license stage of the proceedings but not at the
construction permit stage. Therefore, a nuclear reactor could have been completely con-
structed, though not operating, before decommissioning, general operating, and waste man-
agement expenses were even considered in the financial qualifications determination. It
seems very unlikely that the NRC would have done much about these expenses when the
reactor itself had already been constructed at a cost potentially amounting to billions of
dollars. 10 C.F.R. § 50.33() (1982).
217. In Re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 6 N.R.C. 33 (1977).
218. Id at 35.
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say that the applicant could support its showing of financial qualifica-
tions partly by relying on future, not yet granted rate increases from the
state Public Utility Commission.219 Furthermore, the Board noted,
"[I]t was not error for the [NRC] Licensing Board to have accorded
weight to the prospect of such future rate increases. '"220
Although this decision specifically applied to the financial qualifi-
cations requirement with respect to construction costs, the same princi-
ples that the Board relied upon can be applied to decommissioning
costs. As noted above, the reasonable assurance of obtaining sufficient
funds thirty to forty years in the future would seem to be a nearly im-
possible projection for the Board to make. In addition, by considering
future rate increases that may or may not be granted by state PUCs, the
Board is essentially relieving itself of the ultimate responsibility for as-
suring the licensee's financial viability.
The intervenors appealed the Seabrook decision to the NRC's
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board,221 but were again de-
feated. In affirming the Licensing Board's finding of the prospective
licensee's adequate financial qualifications, the Appeal Board noted
that appendix C of 10 C.F.R., part 50, makes it clear that the "reason-
able assurance" concept is more flexible than many of the Commis-
sion's safety requirements.222 Citing the history of appendix C, the
Licensing Board reasoned that "the 'reasonable assurance' requirement
is not rigid and. . . does not normally contemplate refined analyses of
an applicant's future ability to meet specific costs . . . for established
utilities with substantial operating records, close scrutiny of financial
qualifications was not viewed as necessary to assure that financial con-
siderations did not compromise safety.
' 223
219. Id at 78.
220. Id In support of its reliance on future Public Utility Commission rate increases, the
Board cited Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944),
which, in upholding the rate-making process of the Natural Gas Act to set "just and reason-
able" rates, stated:
From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the,
business. . . By that standard the return to the equity owner. . . should be suffi-
cient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to main-
tain its credit and to attract capital.
In re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, supra note 217, at 77.
221. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 7 N.R.C. 1 (1978).
222. Id at 9. The Appeal Board additionally noted that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
does not require that the NRC examine an applicant's financial qualifications, but merely
authorizes them to do so. Id at 1.
223. Id at 10-11.
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Although the opinion recognizes that the reasonable assurance re-
quirement was adopted to ensure that a licensee's financial condition
would not lead to a compromise in safety, the Licensing Board called
the link between financial qualifications and safety "tenuous."' ' 4 This
extreme interpretation of the financial qualifications standard would
appear to have transformed it into an empty requirement, even before
it was removed from 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f). At best, the opinion indi-
cates that review of an applicant's financial qualifications occurs at a
generalized level, quite apart from considerations of safety, and within
almost total discretion of the NRC.2 -5 It seems quite clear that the
NRC will not act to halt or even postpone the licensing of a nuclear
power plant because of some potential future difficulty in raising funds.
Having exhausted their administrative remedies within the NRC,
the Seabrook intervenors took their case to the First Circuit Court of
Appeals.226 In upholding the NRC's determination that the utility ap-
plicant was financially qualified to build the nuclear plants, the court
gave strong deference to the NRC's determination, noting that "[t]he
Act [AEA of 1954] gives the NRC complete discretion to decide what
financial qualifications are appropriate. The regulations require only a
'reasonable assurance.' We will not second guess the NRC as to its
interpretation of the level of proof that standard requires." 227 The First
Circuit's decision is indicative of the strong judicial deference paid to
the NRC's determinations.
2 8
224. Id at 19. But see infra text accompanying notes 299-300; and In re Cincinnati Gas
and Elec. Co., 12 N.R.C. 704 (1980) in which the Licensing Board, citing the NRC's explicit
decision not to define the precise relationship between safety and financial qualifications in
the Seabrook case, asserted that "the potential safety problems which could result from the
financial difficulties faced recently by the owners of the damaged TMI reactor belie the
asserted lack of safety significance of a financial qualifications inquiry." Id at 707. This
statement indicates that some reevaluation of the financial qualifications requirement within
the NRC may be forthcoming.
225. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, supra note 221, at 21. At the same time
that the Licensing Board was downplaying the significance of the financial qualifications
requirement, it, interestingly, directed the initiation of rule-making for the reexamination of
the factual, legal, and policy aspects of the financial qualifications issue. Id at 20. This
rulemaking led to the ultimate elimination of the financial qualifications review. 47 Fed.
Reg. 13750 (1982).
226. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n., 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978).
227. Id at 93. The court found that although "the evidence does not reveal that PSCO's
[the applicant] financial outlook is rosy. . . we think there is substantial evidence to support
the NRC's conclusion. . ." Id
228. Interpretive decisions of administrative agencies are generally given great deference
by the courts. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1977); United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S. 8 (1970); Red Lion
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Even before the 1982 regulatory change eliminated the financial
qualifications review for electrical utilities seeking to build and operate
nuclear power plants, the NRC, with the First Circuit's approval, had
rendered the review process virtually meaningless. The actual elimina-
tion of the requirement in the regulations was simply the final nail in
the financial qualifications coffin. Public confidence in nuclear power
seems destined to remain low so long as, among other things, there is
no review of an applicant's financial qualifications in NRC licensing
proceedings.
D. The Role of the States in Reactor Decommissioning
There is presently considerable uncertainty with respect to the
proper role of the states in decommissioning nuclear reactors. 229 The
states have traditionally been responsible for the regulation of electric
power utilities within their borders .23  Electric utilities are subject to
such regulation because of their status as natural monopolies. 23 1 Just
how far a state may go in regulating decommissioning remains an open
and important question. The lack of any explicit reference to reactor
decommissioning in the relevant federal legislation coupled with the
NRC's failure to adopt more explicit regulations concerning decom-
missioning only exacerbates the problem.
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For thorough discussion of the Verntont
Yankee case, see Verkuil, Vermont Yankee, 55 TUL. L. REv. 418 (1981); Sekular & McCul-
lough, Litigating Nuclear Waste Disposal Issues Before the NRC: A Fable of Our TiMe, 15
TULSA L.J. 413, 430-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sekular & McCullough].
229. See generally U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N., supra note 157.
230. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3, which gives the California Public Utility Com-
mission the responsibility for supervising and regulating all privately-owned public utilities,
Interstate power transmission is regulated by the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
There are also several federally-created power authorities, the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1982), Bonneville Power Authority (BPA), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 832-832(1) (1982), and the Salt River Project, 43 U.S.C. § 598 (1976)-which operate
under congressional authority, independent of state public utility commissions.
231. See E. MANSFIELD, MICRO-ECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATION 301-07, (4th
ed. 1982). Regulation of electric utilities by the states serves to control the power of the firms
and to protect the public interest. Id The utilities are generally given an exclusive monop-
oly territory and guaranteed a set rate of return, usually between 10% and 12%. Id In
return, the electric utility gives up the right to set its own rates and terms of service to its
customers. FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 143-46. See generally J. BONBRIGIIT, PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REOULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970).
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1. Federal Legislation Relevant to State Regulation of Nuclear
Power Plants
Sections 271 and 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 19 54 131 speak
directly to the intent of Congress in dividing nuclear regulation be-
tween the states and federal government. Section 274, enacted in 1959,
authorizes the NRC to enter into an agreement with any state provid-
ing for the state's assumption of regulatory authority for byproduct,
source, and special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form
a critical mass.3 3 These agreements may also provide for a state's reg-
ulatory authority to extend to commercial shallow land waste sites
within the state.23 The state program must be compatible with the
Commission's program and is governed by the specific regulations of
10 C.F.R. § 150 (1980), "Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Au-
thority in Agreement States under Section 274."
Once the more hazardous nuclear materials, such as spent fuel,
have been removed from the site, the NRC may transfer regulatory
authority for decommissioning to an agreement state.235 Because the
state program must be compatible with the NRC's regulations,2
36
agreement states would be required to follow NRC decommissioning
standards.
Under section 274, the NRC retains sole jurisdiction and responsi-
bility for the regulation of "the construction and operation of any pro-
duction or utilization facility,"' 2 37 which includes nuclear reactors, with
the important proviso that, "[n]othing in this section shall be construed
to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 2 8 This
section alone would argue for state authority to regulate decommission-
ing financing without the need for an agreement with the NRC.
There are, however, even stronger grounds for this conclusion con-
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2021 (1976).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976). As of January 1, 1980,26 states had signed agreements
with the NRC pursuant to this section of the Atomic Energy Act. Jaksetic, Constitutional
Dimension of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear Waste, 32 S.C.L. REv. 789. 749 n.29 (1981).
Critical mass refers to the amount of fissile material required for a self-sustaining chain
reaction. S. GLASSTONE, SOURCEBOOK ON ATOMIC ENERGY 518-19 (3d ed. 1967).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976).
235. At least two experimental reactors have been transferred to agreement states for
decommissioning. A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 2-41.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (1976).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1976).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
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tained in section 271 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.239 This section
provides that nothing in the Act "shall be construed to affect the au-
thority or regulation of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect
to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced
through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission.
240
The legislative history confirms the conclusion that this section was in-
cluded in the Act to make certain that nuclear-generated electricity
would be governed by the same regulations as electricity generated
from other fuels.2' t Jurisdictional problems can arise, however, where
there is no clear line between regulation of rates and services and regu-
lation of radiation hazards. It then becomes important to explore the
actual purpose of the state regulations and the scope of their effect.
242
2. Enacted and Proposed State Decommissioning Laws
During the past several years, as the consciousness of the need to
provide for reactor decommissioning has grown, several states have
proposed and enacted legislation to deal with the decommissioning of
commercial nuclear power plants. By late 1978, thirty-eight states and
Puerto Rico had licensed, ordered, or planned reactors.2 3 In a survey
of these states conducted by the NRC, twenty-nine of these states either
did not or could not indicate their policy with respect to reactor
decommissioning. 44
State public utility commissions are in the difficult position of try-
ing to consider decommissioning costs in setting rates while federal reg-
ulation of reactor decommissioning is in a state of limbo.245 Ideally, it
would seem logical for federal regulations concerning the methods and
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976).
240. Id
241. See 100 CONG. REC. 12025, 12197, 12199 (1954) (remarks of Sens. Hickenlooper
and Humphrey); and H.R. Rep. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2775, 2779. See also Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Senator Hick-
enlooper as follows: "We take the position that electricity is electricity. Once it is produced
it should be subject to the proper regulatory body, whether it be the Federal Power Commis-
sion. . . , State. . . ,or municipal regulatory bodies.")
242. Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 451, 453 (1976),
243. D. CHAPMAN, NUCLEAR ECONOMICS: TAXATION, FUEL COST AND DECOMISSION-
ING 51 (1979).
244. Id This lack of state decommissioning policy is indicative of the confusion and
uncertainty in this area.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 142-65.
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requirements for decommissioning to precede state consideration of
financing decommissioning.
Most states that have attempted to deal with decommissioning
have limited their control to the financing of decommissioning. At
least three states have enacted legislation requiring the posting of a per-
formance bond and contribution by the nuclear licensee to some type
of perpetual care trust fund to provide for decommissioning funds.246
Other states have enacted or proposed establishment of sinking
funds,247 set up by the state PUC to provide for the decontamination
and decommissioning of nuclear facilities.243 A few proposed bills pro-
vide that no nuclear facility may be constructed unless the owner of the
facility has posted a bond equal to thirty percent of the capital cost of
the facility to pay for decontamination and decommissioning, 24 9 or, in
another bill, thirty percent of the estimated total cost of
decommissioning."
Most states that are providing for decommissioning financing al-
low the utility operating the nuclear plant a depreciation adjustment
for decommissioning costs.25' The dominant theme in current state ac-
tion dealing with decommissioning is to make certain that decommis-
sioning funds will be available when needed and, in at least one state,
that decommissioning costs be considered in determining whether a nu-
246. See, eg., TENN. HB-1473 (March 12, 1976); VA. CODE § 32.1-232 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-23-402 (1976); Georgia Radiation Control Amendments, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-1306. (1976), cited in F. Cardile, Summary of State Legislation Related to Decommis-
sioning for the Period January 1975-Present 1 (1981) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinaf-
ter cited as F. Cardile].
247. For a discussion of various financing methods, see infra text accompanying notes
296-327. A sinking fund involves collection of actual funds through the rate base to be
ultimately used to finance decommissioning. This stands in contrast to depreciation adjust-
ment, an unfunded reserve, to account for decommissioning costs.
248. See, eg., N.Y. AB-5566 (1979), SB-3869 (1979) (which would require the New York
Public Service Commission to set up sinking funds for reactor decommissioning); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 162-F:19 (1982) (which establishes a sinking fund for decommissioning to be
held by the state treasurer).
249. See Missouri Nuclear Facility Siting H- 1167 (introduced Jan. 9, 1980), cited in F.
Cardile, supra note 246, at 3. This 30% bonding requirement would amount to a very large
sum of money for a typical nuclear power plant which could conservatively cost S2 billion.
Whether a utility could amass the several hundred million dollars to satisfy such a require-
ment is open to serious question.
250. Florida Nuclear Plant Siting S-461 (introduced March 8, 1980), eitedin F. Cardile,
supra note 246, at 4.
251. See, eg., Hearings 1977, .upra note 12, at 89 (statement of Richard 0. Jones, Con-
necticut Public Utility Control Authority Commissioner).
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clear power plant is cost effective. 252 A dilemma arises in that the cost
of decommissioning cannot be divorced from a consideration of the
method chosen to decommission a plant and regulations imposed on
decommissioning practice. Just how far a state might go in regulating
decommissioning is analyzed in the following discussion of
preemption.
3. Preemption and State Decommissioning Policy
The preemption doctrine is founded upon the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, which provides that the "Constitu-
tion and the Laws of the United States. . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land. 253 When a state law is challenged under this clause, the
focus of the analysis is upon whether Congress intended to prohibit the
states from regulating in such a manner.
254
Without professing to analyze comprehensively the preemption
doctrine, several key points must be kept in mind when considering
state legislation in light of this doctrine.255 Congress may preempt state
regulation in a specific area by so stating in express terms,216 by evi-
dencing the intent to supersede state law, by adopting a pervasive
scheme of federal regulation of a particular area so as to lead to the
reasonable inference that Congress left no room for supplementation,
or because the federal interest in the regulated area is so important as
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. 257 Where
Congress has not completely preempted state law in a particular area,
state law is still preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
252. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.020(3)(b) (1981), cited in F. Cardile, .rupra note 246, at 11, as
Oregon Energy Cost Effectiveness SB-570 (1979).
253. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
254. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). For general
background discussion of the Supremacy Clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 376-401 (1977); see also Tribe, supra note 109, at 679, 688-93.
255. For a detailed discussion of the preemption doctrine's application to nuclear power,
see Jaksetic, supra note 233, at 801-50. Tribe, supra note 109, at 686-703; Murphy & La-
Pierre, supra note 242, at 433-54; Note, Slaying the Nuclear Giants.- Is CalIfornla'r New Nu-
clear Power Plant Siting Legislation Shielded Against the Attack of Federal Preemption?, 8
PAC. L.J. 741, (1977); Note, May a State Say "No"to Nuclear Power? Pacfic Legal Founda.
lion Gives a Disappointing Answer, 10 ENVTL. L. 189 (1979).
256. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983), (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 US. 519, 525
(1977)).
257. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dcv,
Comm'n., 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
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federal law." 8 A conflict arises either when "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," s9 or where
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purpose and objectives of Congress." 26'
At the same time, however, "federal regulation of a field of com-
merce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in
the absence of persuasive reasons."26' Therefore, the presumption op-
erates in favor of a state law's validity. State laws are "preempted only
to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
federal law."262 Especially where the subject matter is traditionally lo-
cal, the courts "start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be [ousted] by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 263
a. The Pacjic Gas & Electric and the Northern States Cases
Two important federal cases have directly confronted the claim
that a state law regulating nuclear power plants was preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
In the leading case in this area, Pacftc Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission,264 the
Supreme Court recently upheld a California statutory provision which
places a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants
until the California Energy Commission determines that a federally ap-
proved method of waste disposal exists.265 In affirming the decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the
California law was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 66
Justice White, writing for the Court, rested this holding on the
258. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dcv.
Comm'n., 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
259. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). quoted
in id. at 1722.
260. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), quotedin Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
261. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
262. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 n.5 (1976) quoted in Tribe, supra note 109, at
689. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit. 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).
263. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
264. 103 S.Ct. 1713 (1983).
265. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL.
PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25000, 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
266. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1728 (1983). Two federal district courts had previously held that
the Atomic Energy Act preempted the California nuclear moratorium law. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F.Supp. 699
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clear language of sections 271 and 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, 267 as
well as the intent of the California nuclear moratorium provision.
Reading sections 271 and 274 and their legislative histories together,
the Court recognized the "fundamental division of authority" 268 be-
tween the federal government, which retains sole authority for regulat-
ing the radiological safety aspects of the construction and operation of
nuclear plants, and the states, which retain their traditional responsibil-
ity in electric utility regulation for determining questions of need, relia-
bility, cost, and related concerns. 269 Thus, a state law banning nuclear
construction grounded in safety concerns would be impliedly pre-
empted under the Atomic Energy Act.270
The Court then goes on to the admittedly more difficult task of
determining whether there is "a non-safety rationale 271 for the Cali-
fornia law. In finding that the California statutory provision at issue
was aimed at economic problems and not radiation hazards, the Court
relies on a California Assembly committee report stating a primary
economic purpose for the statute, and on the Court of Appeals' reading
of the statute to this effect.2 72 In addition, the opinion highlights the
fact that the California law is not concerned with state choice of a
waste disposal method, but only with ensuring that a method be chosen
and accepted by the federal government. 27" The Court thus appears to
(E.D. Cal. 1980), Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
267. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2021 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of these sec-
tions, see supra text accompanying notes 232-242.
268. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Dev, Comm'n
103 S.Ct. 1713, 1724 (1983).
269. Id. at 1723. At a later point in the opinion, Justice White seems to expand the
federal government's sole authority from radiological safety to all safety concerns. Id, at
1726-27. Justice Blackmun recognizes this apparent inconsistency in his concurring opinion.
Id. at 1732.
270. Id. at 1727.
271. Id. (emphasis added). The Court, by speaking in terms of "a non-safety rationale,"
does not clearly answer the question of whether a state law regulating nuclear plants based
on both important economic and safety concerns would pass constitutional muster. A fair
reading of the Court's opinion would appear to permit a state law grounded primarily in
economic concerns but also addressing indivisible safety concerns so long as there was no
actual conflict with federal law. In the field of nuclear power regulation it is difficult to
imagine a law aimed at economic problems that does not also have possible safety
repercussions.
272. Id. at 1727. The Court reaches this conclusion despite some quite compelling argu-
ments that the California nuclear moratorium provision was grounded in health and safety
concerns. See id. at 1727-28; See generally Note, California's Nuclear Power Regulations.
Federal Preemption?, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623 (1982).
273. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dcv.
Comm'n, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1730 (1983).
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accept at face value California's "avowed economic purpose" for the
nuclear moratorium, despite California's clear self-interest in stating a
primary economic purpose so that the law would survive a court
challenge.274
The Court further holds that the California law does not frustrate
the Atomic Energy Act's goal of promoting the development of nuclear
power and is, therefore, not preempted on this basis. This holding is
based on the recognition that "the promotion of nuclear power is not to
be accomplished 'at all costs',"2" and that the states retain sufficient
authority to slow or halt the development of nuclear power on eco-
nomic grounds.276
In the other case, Northern States Power Company v. Minnesota,
277
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the State of Minnesota
was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act from issuing radioactive air
pollution standards more restrictive than! those imposed by the Atomic
Energy Commission. In holding that the state regulations were im-
plicitly preempted by the federal law, the court concluded that section
274 of the AEA "demonstrates Congressional recognition that the AEC
at that time possessed the sole authority to regulate radiation hazards
associated with by-product, source, and special nuclear materials and
with production and utilization facilities."'2 79 These findings of con-
gressional intent outweighed, in the court's opinion, the state's argu-
ment that the regulation of radioactive effluent releases were within the
274. See id. at 1728 where the Court offers that: "[W]e should not become embroiled in
attempting to ascertain California's true motive." The Court additionally notes that it
would be pointless to engage in such an inquiry and possibly find the California law pre-
empted when the state could, in an individual proceeding, refuse to permit a nuclear plant to
be built on economic grounds. Id. This latter argument does not appear to have anything to
do with the constitutionality of California's nuclear moratorium law other than to evidence
a recognition that if a state is intent on preventing new nuclear plants from being built
within its borders, it may do so on economic grounds.
275. Id. at 1731.
276. Id. at 1732. The Court is unwilling to go so far, however, as to follow the position
of the court of appeals, adopted by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion, id. at 1732,
that the 1974 legislation separating the promotional and regulatory functions in the nuclear
field evidences the intent of Congress to place reduced emphasis on developing nuclear
power relative to other energy sources. Id. at 1734. The Court continues to recognize the
promotion of nuclear power as a strong purpose of the Atomic Energy Act.
277. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afdmenm, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
278. Id at 1149. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1977),
overturned the holding in Northern States Power with respect to the regulation of radioac-
tive air pollutants. States and localities are no longer preempted "from setting and enforcing
stricter air pollution standards for radiation than the Federal standards." H.R. REP. No.
564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1977).
279. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota. 447 F.2d 1143, 1149 (8th Cir. 1971).
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state's traditional power under the tenth amendment to protect and
promote the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens.280 The
court, however, was careful to limit its holding that the AEA preempts
only state regulations directed at radiation hazards.281
In Northern States Power, the court was able to rely on congres-
sional discussion of the regulation of radiation hazards in finding that
Congress intended to preempt the states in this area.282 A similar reli-
ance on express congressional intent would not be possible with decom-
missioning because it is not explicitly discussed either in the AEA or its
legislative history.
After Pacfc Gas & Electric and Northern States Power, it is not
completely clear how far a state may go in regulating nuclear reactor
decommissioning. It seems evident that a state may consider decom-
missioning as one cost factor in determining whether a nuclear plant is
economically justified. It also appears clear that a state may provide
for the financing of decommissioning through its rate-making author-
ity. This is predominantly an economic consideration within the pur-
view of the states.28 3 At the same time, the level of funding provided
for decommissioning could have definite ramifications with respect to
radiation hazards. In adopting decommissioning regulations, states
should be careful to specify a primary economic purpose for the regula-
tions. For example, a state should be able to require a utility to submit
a decommissioning plan so long as the state's primary motivation was
non-safety related.
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, a state now has the
authority to set more restrictive radiation effluent standards than those
imposed by the NRC.284 Whether a state could set these standards so
280. Id at 1150, quotedin Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
and Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 923 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
281. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1149-50.
The Supreme Court in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n acknowledges its affirmance in Northern States Power, finding it fully
consistent with its reading of the division of nuclear regulatory authority between the states
and the federal government. 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1726 n.24 (1983). The Court is careful to qual-
ify this statement, however, by noting that its summary aflirmance in Northern States Power
is not to be read as an adoption of the court of appeals' reasoning. Id. The Court may have
added this latter qualification partially because the court of appeals in Northern States
Power held that the AEA preempts only state regulations aimed at radiation hazards, while
the Supreme Court in Pacfic Gas & Electric seems to carve out the potentiallny broader field
of all safety aspects of nuclear energy. 1d. at 1726.
282. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d at 1151-53.
283. Id at 922.
284. See supra note 278.
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strictly as to essentially dictate a method of decommissioning is not at
all clear. There is, however, some authority for the proposition that a
state could set radiation effluent standards at a level that would prevent
nuclear plants from being built at all.
285
The fundamental issue is whether a state can go so far as to re-
quire that a particular method of reactor decommissioning be em-
ployed. If a state follows the holding of Pacfc Gas & Electric, it could
presumably place a "hold" on new nuclear power plant construction
until federal guidelines are established for reactor decommissioning
and a clearly approved method or methods of decommissioning are
indicated by the NRC. This would not, however, cover the decommis-
sioning of presently licensed, operating reactors.
Given the lack of federal legislation and the uncertainty of NRC
regulations covering reactor decommissioning, a state might, in practi-
cal terms, be able to set its own technical guidelines for the decommis-
sioning of a reactor within its borders, so long as the state could show a
primary non-safety purpose. A serious problem could arise, however,
where one utility owns reactors in several states or where multi-state
utilities own shares of one reactor and the utility or utilities are faced
with conflicting state decommissioning standards. This possibility
would argue for uniform and consistent federal policy covering reactor
decommissioning.
The courts in both Pac#Fc Gas & Electric and Northern States
Power, however, are firm in reading the intent of the Atomic Energy
Act as being to preempt state regulations directed at radiation hazards.
Thus, state attempts to establish guidelines for decommissioning which
are clearly directed at protecting the public from radiation hazards
would be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.
b. Preemption and State Regulation of the Financing of
Decommissioning
Another option would be to limit state concern to financing
decommissioning, but, at the same time, require that the collection of
decommissioning funds be based on a particular method of decommis-
sioning. In the absence of federal regulations specifying one method of
decommissioning over others, it would be difficult to see how a state
could be prevented from taking such action.
285. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 927 (9th Cir. 1981), citing Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc, 7
N.R.C. 31, 34 n.13 (1978).
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A corollary to the question of how far a state could go in regulat-
ing decommissioning is how far the NRC could go in regulating the
financing of decommissioning. To this point, the NRC appears to have
adopted the view that financing decommissioning is the job of the
states.286 Some state officials have taken the view, however, that
financial assurance for reactor decommissioning is clearly the province
of the NRC and not the states.287
The NRC's Legal Director has expressed the opinion that, under
sections 161 (b) and 182 of the Atomic Energy Act,288 the NRC has suf-
ficiently broad statutory authority to require nuclear power plant licen-
sees to post bonds to assure performance of decommissioning
requirements. 28 9 This point of view is, however, anything but certain.
Neither the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) nor the Energy Re-
organization Act of 1974 give the NRC any specific authority to require
licensees to post bonds for decommissioning. In fact, in 1963 the AEC,
predecessor to the NRC, supported an amendment to the AEA that
would have given the Commission authority to require licensees to post
bonds.290 The AEC claimed that without such legislation it did not
have the authority to impose such a requirement. Congress, however,
took no action on this proposed amendment and it died.29'
Section 271 of the AEA, which expressly leaves regulation of the
generation, sale, and transmission of electricity with the appropriate
federal, state, or local authority, also supports the notion that Congress
intended to leave the financing of electric utilities to the states where, in
most cases, it has traditionally rested.292 Financing decommissioning,
as part of the cost incurred to provide electricity, is arguably part of a
state's regulation of the sale of electricity, one of the areas specifically
excluded from NRC jurisdiction by section 271 of the AEA.293
A state interested in challenging an NRC bonding requirement for
nuclear power plant decommissioning might also argue that under the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, electric utility
financing, of which decommissioning financing is a part, is an area re-
served for the states. In addition, "where the subject is traditionally
286. A. SCHILLING, supra note 137, at 4-19.
287. Id
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (1976). See also supra text accompanying note 116.
289. Hearings 1977, supra note 12, at 63 (statement of Howard Shapar).
290. Id
291. Id
292. See supra note 230 for discussion of situations where electric utility rates are not
within the states' authority.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976).
[Vol, 6
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
'local,'. . . total federal preemption will not be inferred in the absence
of especially plain congressional intent to bar state authority over the
same subject matter."2 94 The presumption, in this case, is in favor of
the state regulation.
On the other hand, the NRC could argue that by requiring licen-
sees to post bonds for decommissioning, it would be protecting the pub-
lic from radiation hazards according to its clear mandate in section 182
of the AEA. Without express congressional authorization for the NRC
to require bonds from nuclear reactor licensees, however, this power
would seem to continue to rest with the states. The validity of state
decommissioning regulation will, in the final analysis, likely depend
upon whether or not the purpose of the regulation is to deal with radia-
tion hazards.
E. Financing Options for Decommissioning
One of the major areas of debate concerning decommissioning in-
volves the choice of a financing method. This section will introduce the
reader to the general considerations in choosing a financing method, as
well as review the major financing options being evaluated. This dis-
cussion is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the different
options, but rather is presented to give the reader a better basis for
understanding an overall system for decommissioning regulation. As-
suring adequate financing for decommissioning will surely play a cen-
tral role in any regulatory scheme developed.
1. The Basic Concerns
The adequacy of decommissioning funds is intimately connected
with the issue of the health and safety impact of decommissioning. In
addition, recognizing and planning for the funding of decommissioning
before a nuclear power plant is licensed (or as soon as possible for nu-
clear power plants already in operation) is important for assessing the
full costs of nuclear power as well as for comparing these costs to those
of available energy alternatives.
For the most part, states and utilities have established minimal or
no special plans for funding decommissioning. A General Accounting
Office survey found that out of thirty-two utilities operating nuclear
294. L. TRIBE, supra note 254, at 691. See also supra text accompanying note 263. It is
also not clear whether the NRC has the authority to require a licensee to post a bond to
assure compliance with certain restrictions intended to continue after license termination.
See Hearings 1977, supra note 12, at 63 (statement of H. Shapar).
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power plants, fifteen had established no special provisions for decom-
missioning.29 Several states, however, have recently begun to consider
and, in some cases, take action to provide for decommissioning
funding.296
Complete consideration of decommissioning financing involves
not only planning for decommissioning at the end of the expected oper-
ating life of the reactor, but being prepared for the decommissioning of
reactors prematurely shut down for technical or accident-related rea-
sons. As the accident at Three Mile Island continues to illustrate,
cleaning up and decommissioning an accident-damaged reactor poses
serious technical, political, and economic problems.297 In addition, the
length of the normal operating life of a large commercial nuclear reac-
tor is still uncertain. No commercial reactor has yet been in service for
an entire projected thirty to forty year life.298
The major considerations in choosing a decommissioning funding
method, irrespective of the decommissioning technology chosen, are as-
surance, equity, cost, planning uncertainty, and tax consequences. 299
Assurance refers to the probability that adequate funds will actually be
available when needed (i e., at the time of decommissioning). The
NRC staff considers the actual degree of assurance to be the most im-
portant criterion in evaluating funding alternatives. This concern
grows largely from questions about the nuclear reactor owners' future
existence and solvency at the time of reactor shutdown, perhaps thirty
to forty years in the future, and during the time of plant decommission-
295. CURA, supra note 10, at 52-53.
296. For a review of significant state actions through 1980, see id at 91-95. See also CAL.
PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, FINANCING DECOMMISSIONING COSTS, 011-86 (Hearings held Oct.
1981 and Jan., Feb. 1982). Reactor operators in California are currently using the straight
line method of depreciation to recover the estimated cost of decommissioning. SECRETARY
FOR RESOURCES', supra note 144, at v-80.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93 for background on the estimated costs of
cleaning up and decommissioning TMI-2.
298. CURA, supra note 10, at 56.
299. The NRC has recognized five criteria for evaluating the relative effectiveness of
alternative decommissioning financing methods; assurance, cost, equity, responsiveness to
changing conditions, and ability to handle different ownership and jurisdictional arrange-
ments. Federal income tax considerations are included in the consideration of cost. R.
WOOD, ASSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR FACILI-
TIES (Draft Report), NUREG-0584, 6-8, 17 (1980).
Another consideration is the cost of the funding method. One study concludes, how-
ever, that "there is little variation in total price as a result of variations in finance." D.
CHAPMAN, supra note 243, at 58. Sufficient funds to cover thefull cost of decommissioning
must, in any event, be collected. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83 for discussion of
present cost estimates for commercial nuclear reactor decommissioning.
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ing, up to one hundred years or more depending on the method of
decommissioning chosen.3"o
The equity criterion involves consideration as to whether decom-
missioning costs are paid for by those benefiting from the electricity
generated by the plant. It would be inequitable to shift these costs to
future customers or society-at-large. The cost should be equitably dis-
tributed among the beneficiaries of the electricity.
Planning uncertainty is closely tied to the cost and assurance crite-
ria. Because of the difficulty of predicting economic conditions thirty
to forty years into the future, any decommissioning funding plan will
necessarily have to be periodically evaluated and adjusted to reflect
changing conditions.
Under current Internal Revenue Service (IRS) policy, money col-
lected during a plant's operation for decommissioning cannot be de-
ducted as an expense from the utility's taxable income.30  Deduction
for decommissioning costs is allowed only in the years in which such
expenses are incurred.3 2 Therefore, a utility, though able to ultimately
deduct decommissioning expenses from its gross income at the time of
decommissioning, loses earlier use of the cash assets that annual depre-
ciation deductions provide.30 3
A bill was offered in the Ninety-Seventh Congress which would
have amended section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code to allow de-
ductions for funds collected for eventual decommissioning and spent
fuel disposal associated with nuclear power plants.3°  The policy issue
300. CHAPMAN, .supra note 243, at 6. But see CAL PUB. UTIL COMIM'N, Stud of Recov-
ery of Decommissioning Costs, 011-86, 5-1 (1981), which questions the importance of the
assurance criterion on the bases that: 1) decommissioning financing requirements are small
in relation to a utility's normal funding requirements; and 2) utility insolvency is not a real-
istic risk, or, at best, is extremely unusual.
301. R. WooD, supra note 299, at 18.
302. Id The Internal Revenue Service had given the NRC an earlier indication that
under certain limited conditions it would agree not to treat decommissioning funds as in-
come in the year collected. Id at 19. Such tax exemption now appears unlikely, however,
without specific federal legislation. R. WOOD, QUALIFICATIONS AND PREPARED TESTI-
MONY, 011-86, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 12 (1982). It should be noted
that the IRS has not issued a revenue ruling on the specific treatment of decommissioning
funds.
303. R. WOOD, supra note 299, at 18.
304. The bill, H.R. 3498, 97th Cong., 1st Sss. (1981), was introduced on May 7, 1981,
and referred to the House Ways and Means Committee, which did not act on the legislation.
The bill defines decommissioning costs to include "expenditures associated with those activi-
ties that relate to the retirement of a nuclear power plant and which are recognized b), the
regulatory body having ratemakingjurisdiction." (emphasis added). If enacted, this clause
would have evidenced congressional intent that decommissioning financing is the responsi-
bility of state public utility commissions.
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involved is whether decommissioning funds collected should be exempt
from gross income, amounting to an indirect subsidy for nuclear power.
On the one hand, if adequate, safe decommissioning is to be en-
couraged and the financial burden on the utilities and ratepayers is to
be reduced, the deduction could provide a positive incentive. The bill,
however, died in committee. 0 5 Such a deduction would amount to an-
other subsidy, albeit relatively small, to an industry already receiving
massive government subsidies in the form of research and development
funds, government ownership of uranium enrichment plants, the lim-
ited liability provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, and tax advantages
to utilities for building new generating capacity, nuclear or other-
wise.30 6 One study found that thirty percent of the cost of nuclear
power is paid for in tax subsidies.
30 7
2. Financing Methods
The major alternatives for financing decommissioning, whether
administered by the states or the NRC, are 1) expensing the costs when
incurred; 2) negative net salvage value depreciation; 3) prepayment re-
serve; 4) external sinking fund; and 5) decommissioning insurance.30 8
Expensing decommissioning costs involves deferral of the collec-
tion of funds until that future time when they are needed. The two
major problems with this method are the inequitable burden that it
places on future ratepayers who may not have received the benefits of
the nuclear generated electricity, and the lack of assurance it provides
in the event of future utility insolvency or financial difficulties. Major
studies have not treated this as an acceptable alternative for these
reasons.3
09
Negative net salvage value depreciation, often referred to as inter-
nal reserve or unsegregated sinking fund, allows estimated decommis-
sioning costs to be accumulated over the life of the facility.3t0 In the
case of a nuclear reactor, salvage value is actually negative so that the
305. Id
306. See, e.g., Note, Federal Tax Subsidiesfor Electric Utilities.- An Energy Pollc Per-
spective, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 317-35 (1980). For example, between 1954 and 1976,
total utility operating revenues rose 664%, net income was up approximately 400%, but fed-
eral income tax payments by utilities fell 31%. Id at 335.
307. D. CHAPMAN, supra note 243, at 44.
308. For critical analyses of these methods, see CURA, supra note 10, at 58-62; SEc Rt-
TARY FOR RESOURCES', supra note 144, at v-64 to v-80; R. WOOD, supra note 299, at 14-53.
309. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N., STUDY OF RECOVERY OF DECOMMtSSIONINO
COSTS, 011-86, 1-1 (1981); CURA, supra note 10, at 58.
310. R. WOOD, supra note 299, at 10-I1.
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net depreciation value equals the plant's original capital cost plus its
net decommissioning cost.3" Utilities generally favor this method be-
cause it is considered to be a less costly alternative than the other op-
tions, and the funds collected can be invested in the utility's assets.
312
Because this is essentially an unfunded reserve and presents accompa-
nying assurance problems, the NRC's position is that this method
should be considered adequate only if supplemented by other substan-
tial mechanisms that meet the assurance concerns.
3 13
The prepayment option requires the utility to set aside sufficient
funds at the time of reactor start-up, or at the present time in the case of
operating reactors, to cover the projected costs of decommissioning.
This reserve would be invested in general liquifiable assets until needed
and would be administered as a separate fund either by the utility or by
an external body such as a public utility commission.
314
The external sinking fund involves the establishment of a separate
fund in trust, not initially capitalized, but accumulated as ratepayers
pay into it over the nuclear power plant's projected life.315 As with the
prepayment reserve, this fund could either be administered by the util-
ity or by an independent regulatory body. Annual amounts contrib-
uted on a sinking fund basis would be calculated so that the principal
and earnings would cover the projected cost of decommissioning. This
method and the prepayment reserve are generally considered the pre-
ferred funding alternatives for decommissioning. 316
3. Funding Premature Decommissioning
The major weakness of the sinking fund and, to a lesser extent, the
prepayment reserve is that in the event of premature shutdown and
decommissioning, actual costs would likely exceed original cost esti-
mates, and thus, adequate funds would not be available to cover
decommissioning costs. If the premature shutdown is the result of an
accident at the plant, the financing problem is exacerbated by the cost
uncertainty to decontaminate and decommission a plant, because the
311. Id
312. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-16.
313. Id at 2-17.
314. R. Knecht, Finance and Ratemalcingfor Decommissioning Cost, Prepared Testimon,
of Ronald L Knecht and Report of the Special Economics Section of the Revenue Regulations
Division of the CPUC Staff, OI-86, 3 (1982). The amount to be deposited would be calcu-
lated so that the principal and accumulated interest would just cover estimated decommis-
sioning costs at the end of the plant's projected life.
315. Id at 4.
316. DGEIS, supra note 28, at 2-16.
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cost will vary depending on the type and scope of the accident.31 7
It seems evident that some funding mechanism to deal with pre-
mature decommissioning is needed, but none is specifically required at
present. A new NRC regulation does now require that utilities operat-
ing nuclear power plants carry the maximum amount of property in-
surance reasonably available, or its equivalent.31 8 The TMI accident,
however, dramatically demonstrated that the present level of available
property insurance, approximately $300 million, may be grossly inade-
quate to cover the costs associated with premature decommissioning.
31 9
Private insurance companies "have been reluctant to commit their re-
sources to an industry that is perceived as stagnant. 320
Several proposals dealing with the cost of premature decommis-
sioning deserve brief mention. Utilities have formed Nuclear Energy
Insurance, Ltd. (NEIL) to provide replacement power insurance in the
event of an extended or permanent shutdown of nuclear plants.
321
NEIL, however, is not designed to cover clean up and decommission-
ing costs at all, and only offers coverage for a small percentage of re-
placement power costs.
322
Surety bonding has also been suggested as a way to assure that
decommissioning costs are met. A survey of surety bonding companies
by the NRC, however, led it to conclude that surety bonds of the size
necessary and for the time needed for decommissioning would not be
317. In addition, it is not clear where one draws the line between clean up of a reactor
closed by an accident and decommissioning of that reactor. This division may be important
in allocating funds collected specifically to finance decommissioning. Even if a reactor is not
shut down by an accident, the accumulated funds for decommissioning may fall substan-
tially short of the amount required if the estimated reactor life is in error and the reactor
must be prematurely shut down. Such a premature shutdown and the attendant costs to the
utility of buying replacement power, as well as decontaminating and decommissioning a
nuclear power plant, may jeopardize a utility's solvency. See R. WooD, supra note 299, at 4,
where the author notes: "prior to the TMI accident, General Public Utilities [CPU] and its
operating companies (the licensees) were generally thought to be financially sound." See
also supra text accompanying notes 92-94 for discussion of the accident's financial impact on
GPU.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30 for a discussion of this new regulation.
319. The United States General Accounting Office has estimated the total cost of clean-
ing up TMI-2 at $650 million to $1.3 billion. GAO 1981,supra note 92, at vii. This does not
include the added cost to the utility of buying replacement power from neighboring utilities.
320. Id This type of utility property insurance is to be distinguished from utility liability
insurance for personal injury and property damage from a nuclear accident, which is gov-
erned by the Price-Anderson Act. See supra text accompanying notes 179-84 for a discus-
sion of this Act.
321. Kimball, supra note 130, at 359.
322. Id at 364.
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available.3
The most seriously considered alternative for funding premature
decommissioning is the establishment of some type of premature
decommissioning insurance fund. Just what form this insurance would
take is, however, subject to great debate. Issues include whether the
premiums should be paid for by the utilities, the ratepayers, the nuclear
industry, or by some combination of the three,3  and whether this in-
surance should be privately administered or set up by the federal
government.
There has been some discussion among private nuclear insurance
pools of increasing the level of indemnification for accident-caused
property damage, but no definite plans have been made yet? Given
the uncertainty and current lack of adequate insurance coverage for
premature, accident-related decommissioning, several bills were intro-
duced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress to establish a supplementary in-
surance fund, administered by the Department of Energy or a quasi-
governmental corporation to be established, to cover the cost of
cleanup, including decommissioning, following damage to nuclear
power plants.326 Under these proposals, mandatory premiums would
be collected from utilities operating nuclear plants to pay both for fu-
ture accident losses and for part of the TMI-2 cleanup costs. The
Ninety-Seventh Congress, however, did not act on this proposed
legislation.
A recent report indicates that the NRC is seriously considering
323. R. WOOD, supra note 299, at 45.
324. At least one state, West Virginia, has introduced legislation prohibiting the costs of
insuring a nuclear power plant operator in the event of an accident from being charged to
the rate base. W. VA., Nuclear Liability SB 25 (introduced Jan. 9, 1980). For a discussion of
the question as to who should pay the premiums for such insurance, see Kimball, upra note
130, at 364-66. If some or all of these costs are passed through to the ratepayers, "the effect
could be to remove a safety incentive." Id at 365.
325. R. WOOD, supra note 299, at 49. See also NUCLEONICS WK., May 21, 1981, at 4,
which reports plans announced by the American Nuclear Insurers and the Mutual Atomic
Energy Reinsurance Pool to increase on-site property damage coverage from the current
maximum level of $369 million to SI billion.
326. See, eg., S. 1606, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Payment into the fund would be a
prerequisite for the licensing and continued operation of a nuclear power plant); S. 1226,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2512, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
With respect to the clean-up costs at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania's Governor
Thornburgh has proposed a cost-sharing arrangement whereby the nuclear industry and
federal government would each pay 25% of the remaining costs, with the other 50% to be
split between GPU (owner of TMI), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the State of
New Jersey. Thornburgh's Proposalfor TMI-2 Financing, NUCLEONICS WK., July 16, 1981,
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two proposals.327 The first proposal would require a utility to pay into
a special fund the entire decommissioning cost prior to plant startup.
Alternatively, a utility might pay into a sinking fund over the projected
life of the plant, but only if the utility had sufficient premature decom-
missioning insurance.
V. DECOMMISSIONING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY (WEST GERMANY)
A. Scope of the Problem
The first nuclear power plant in Germany, the fifteen megawatt
(electric) (MWe) experimental nuclear energy plant in Kahl, began op-
eration in 1960.328 There are currently fifteen commercial nuclear
power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany),
with a total capacity of 8500 MWe, or about twelve percent of the na-
tion's electric generating capacity.3 29 In addition, ten nuclear plants,
with planned capacity of approximately 10,000 MWe, are currently
under construction.330 Because of West Germany's lack of indigenous
energy resources and correspondingly heavy dependence on foreign oil,
which represents over fifty percent of primary energy consumption in
the country, the nuclear share of the nation's energy supply picture is
expected to increase in the decades ahead.331 Given this situation, nu-
clear power plant decommissioning is an important concern facing
West Germany.
Decommissioning experience in West Germany, to date, has been
quite limited. In fact, no plant has yet been decommissioned by dis-
327. Norman, A4 Long-Term Problemfor the Nuclear Industry, SCh 376, 378 (Jan, 22,
1982).
328. Watzel, Essmann & Lukacs, Decommissioning Situation in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, 361 (M.
Osterhout ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Watzel].
329. Roser, Nuclear Energy and International Relations: The Casefor the Federal Repub.
lic of Germany, 73 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 166, 167 (1979). According to a later survey,
however, only 11 nuclear power plants operated in West Germany in 1981. NUCLEONICS
WK., Jan. 28, 1982, at 14.
330. Roser, supra note 329 at 167. West Germany also has an active nuclear export
program. See, e.g., Smith & Golden, CoordinatingActivities, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
353, 366 (1978), which describes West Germany's 1975 agreement with Brazil to build eight
nuclear power plants and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities by 1990 at a cost of $5 billion
(1975 United States dollars).
331. Roser, supra note 329, at 167. Nuclear capacity is projected by one author at 54,000
to 75,000 MWe by the year 2000. Id See also NUCLEONICS WK., Nov. 12, 1981, at 9, which
reports that the Bonn government projects an increasing role for nuclear power in West
Germany's power supply scenario.
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mantlement, although a few reactors have been placed in safe storage,
or mothballed, pending the availability of a waste disposal site.332 One
of these reactors is the 100 MWe KKN Niederaichbaen plant expected
to generate approximately 2000 tons of waste at a projected cost of DM
80 million (approximately $40 million).333 It has been estimated that
by the year 2010, twelve light water reactors will have to be decommis-
sioned, generating approximately 80,000 megagrams (Mg) of decom-
missioning wastes.
334
Several studies on the cost, technical, and safety aspects of decom-
missioning large commercial reactors are currently proceeding in West
Germany.335 The two primary decommissioning options being consid-
ered are mothballing, or protective storage, and dismantlement.336
B. The German Legal System: Some General Comments
The German legal system is based on Roman, or civil, law. This is
in contrast to the common law tradition of the United States and Eng-
land. Unlike common law jurisdiction courts, "Roman law justice is
intended to enforce, not to 'interpret' the law" and "precedent is not
necessarily binding on court decisions ... -337 Civil law countries,
such as France and West Germany, have a separate system of adminis-
trative courts with jurisdiction over public law controversies, including
nuclear energy, free of constitutional issues. In particular, challenges
to the actions of administrative agencies are heard by these courts.333
The administrative courts are independent of the government's admin-
332. Watzel, supra note 328, at 378-80.
333. G. Calkins, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum, Tro Report-
Decommissioning Information Gathering Team 19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as G. Calkins,
Memorandum].
334. Auler, Brewitz & Reichenbecher, Waste .4anagement.Requirements to be Taken into
Account in the Design of Nuclear Facilities in View of Their Decommissioning, in NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY (OECD), PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIALISTS MEETING ON DECO.MtwIS-
SIONING REQUIREMENTS IN THE DESIGN OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 239 (1980).
335. Essmann, Brosche, Thalmann, Vollradt & Watzel, Provisionfor Decommlssioning
L WR Power Plants by the German Utilities, in DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES:
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMBER 1978, JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY
THE IAEA AND (OECD) 58 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Essmann].
336. G. Calkins, Memorandum, supra note 333, at 2.
337. Nelkin & Pollak, French and German Courts on Nuclear Power, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS May 1980, at 36.
338. The basic principles of the administrative courts are set forth in the Law on Admin-
istrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerischtsordnung) of Jan. 1, 1960, 1960 Bundesgesetz-
blatt [BGB1] 117 (W. GER). See also Feld, The German Administrative Courts, 36 TUL L
REv. 495 (1962).
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istrative agencies. 33 9
Upon the filing of a complaint alleging the violation of an admin-
istrative act, the lower administrative court decides whether an admin-
istrative agency has acted within its statutory power.340 Decisions of
the lower administrative courts may be appealed to administrative ap-
peals courts and ultimately to the Supreme Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht). This is the court of final jurisdiction for
administrative law questions except where an administrative statute-
federal or state-is challenged as violating the federal constitution.34'
In this case, the Federal Constitutional Court has ultimate jurisdiction
to decide whether a statute violates the German Federal
Constitution.
342
As in the United States, there is a division of power in West Ger-
many between the states (Lander) and the Federation (Bund). The
German Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) provides that all powers
not assigned to the Federation belong to the Lander,343 and that Feder-
ation law overrides that of the Lander in the event of conflict.3" Thus,
as in the United States, original authority lies with the states insofar as
it is not expressly allocated to the Federation.
C. Legislation and Regulations Relevant to Decommissioning
According to article seventy-four of the Federal Constitution
(Grundgesetz), the Federation has concurrent power to enact legislation
pertaining to energy in general, and to nuclear energy in particular.
3 45
The Federation exercised this power by enacting the "Law on the
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Protection Against its Hazards"
(4tomgeselz or Atomic Energy Law) in 1959,346 thereby preempting the
states from legislating in this area.
In a recent decision, the German Constitutional Court found the
peaceful use of nuclear energy to be constitutional, reasoning that the
Grundgesetz acknowledges the peaceful use of nuclear energy by giving
the federal parliament power to legislate on this subject.
347
339. Id
340. Rupp, Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 AM. J. CoMp. L. 29, 39
(1960).
341. Id at 40.
342. Id
343. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 30 (W. Ger.).
344. Id art. 31.
345. GG art. 74, cl. 1 l(a) (W. Ger.).
346. Atomgesetz, 1959 BGBI I 814 (W. Ger.).
347. 1980 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] DVbi 356 (W. Ger.).
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The stated purpose of the Atomic Energy Law (Atomgesetz) is
both to foster the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
and to protect the health, safety, and property of persons from the
hazards of nuclear energy, including the harmful effects of ionizing ra-
diation.34 Thus, the Atomic Energy Law contains the dual, and poten-
tially conflicting, goals of promoting nuclear energy and protecting the
public from its harmful effects. In 1972, however, the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court ruled that of the stated goals of the Atomic Energy Law,
safety must take precedence over the promotion of nuclear energy.3 9
Licensing of nuclear facilities, including power plants, is governed
by section seven of the Atomic Energy Law and by specific federal li-
censing regulations.350 The actual administration of the licensing pro-
cess is carried out by the states on behalf of the Federation, pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Law.351 A license is required of any person who
operates a "stationary installation for the production, treatment,
processing or fission of nuclear fuel. . . or who materially alters such
installation, or its operation."352 Decommissioning nuclear power
plants would, therefore, be governed by this section as a material alter-
ation of a nuclear installation. The Atomic Energy Law also provides
that" [a] license may be granted only. . . [w]here there are no known
facts giving rise to any doubts as to the reliabilit of the applicant
. . . ,,353 This would appear to include any doubts as to an applicant's
present and future solvency with respect to the operation and decom-
missioning of a nuclear power plant.
The Atomic Energy Law also provides that a license may be issued
only after every safety precaution has been taken in light of existing
scientific knowledge and technology.354 As applied to reactor decom-
missioning, this provision would mean that a plant must be decommis-
348. Atomgesetz § 1, 1959 (W. Ger.).
349. Nelkin & Pollak, supra note 337, at 38.
350. Atomrechtliche Verfahrensordnung of Feb. 18, 1977, 1977 BGBI 1280 (W. Ger.).
351. Atomgesetz § 24, 1959 (W. Ger.). Thus, there is no single central body in West
Germany in which all responsibilities for nuclear facility licensing are vested, as in the
United States.
352. Atomgesetz § 7(1), 1976 BGBI 3053 (W. Ger.), translatedin 18 NUCLEAR L BULL.
5, 7 (Supp. 1976). The licensing process involves a series of provisional decisions with re-
spect to individual questions such as siting, followed by application for construction ap-
proval and ultimately for a license to operate the facility. Thus, the permit and licensing
process takes place in several stages. Atomgesetz § 7(a)(l) (W. Gcr.), translated in 15 NU-
CLEAR L. BULL. 5, 12 (Supp. 1975).
353. Atomgesetz § 7(2)1, 1976 (W. Ger.), translated in 18 NUCLEAR L. BULL 5, 7 (Supp.
1976) (emphasis added).
354. Atomgesetz § 7(2)3, 1976 BGBI I 814 (W. Ger.).
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sioned using the best available technology in order to ensure the
protection of the public's health and safety, regardless of the economics
of the alternatives.
Until 1976, the Atomic Energy Law contained no specific refer-
ence to decommissioning. In that year, the Act was amended to pro-
vide that: "The decommissioning of an installation . . . as well as the
safe enclosure of a finally decommissioned installation or the disman-
tling of the installation or parts thereof, are subject to a license.
' '35 "
This subsection was added to clarify the fact that decommissioning is
subject to the licensing requirements of the Atomic Energy Law.
356
Under the present law, a separate license must be obtained for a
nuclear power plant's construction, operation, and decommissioning.
Within the decommissioning process itself, a separate license is re-
quired for shutdown, safe storage or mothballing, and dismantle-
ment. 7 There are, however, no specific regulations which have been
promulgated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Law concerning the
proper method(s) for decommissioning a nuclear facility.
The "Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" issued in 1974 by
the Federal Ministry of the Interior does devote a section to decommis-
sioning. Section 2.10, "Decommissioning and Removal of Nuclear
Power Plants," requires that nuclear plants be designed to allow for
their decommissioning in accordance with radiation protection regula-
tions, and that a plan for dismantlement and removal of the plant be
submitted after its final shutdown.358 In other words, this criterion re-
quires that in considering issuance of a construction license, decommis-
sioning should be contemplated and incorporated in the plant design to
facilitate the plant's ultimate decommissioning.
The only other official mention of decommissioning is contained
in the "Guidelines of the Commission on Reactor Safety for Pres-
surized Water Reactors. ' 359 These guidelines recommend that: 1) the
355. Atomgesetz § 7(3), 1976 BGBI 13053 (W. Ger.), translated in 18 NUCLEAR L. BULL.
5, 8 (Supp. 1976).
356. H. Schornhoop, 1977 Dvbe 322, 325. There has been some discussion of amending
section 7(3) of the Atomic Energy Law to indicate that decommissioning is used as a generic
term and may be effectuated by entombment, mothballing, or dismantlement, von Busekist,
supra note 9, at 31.
357. G. Calkins, Memorandum, supra note 333, at 18.
358. Sicherheitskriterien fur Kernkraftwerke, 1977 Bundesanzeiger [BAnz] Nr, 206 (W.
Ger.). Criteria published by the Federal Ministry of the Interior are binding on the licensing
authorities, although they have no direct legal effect on the plant operator. von Busekist,
supra note 9, at 39 n.ll.
359. Guidelines are issued by the Commission to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and
are advisory in nature, having no direct legal force. von Busekist, supra note 9, at 39 n.12.
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plant design take into account the eventual decommissioning measures;
2) plant components be designed and situated to allow for decontami-
nation, dismantlement, and transport with the lowest possible radiation
exposure; 3) a decommissioning plan be required; and 4) good docu-
mentation be established and maintained to aid in the eventual decom-
missioning of the plant.3 6 ° Although these guidelines do not have any
direct legal enforceability, they do reinforce the notion in section 2.10
of the safety criteria that plant design must account for the eventual
decommissioning of the plant.
D. Financing Decommissioning
One area of concern about decommissioning that is conspicuously
absent from the Atomic Energy Law and the accompanying regulations
is that of financing the decommissioning. In order to understand the
importance of decommissioning funding in West Germany it is neces-
sary to understand the country's basic electric utility structure.
Electric utilities are subject to federal regulation pursuant to the
Power Industries Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz).361 Under this Act, the
Federal Ministry of the Economy is authorized to require technical and
economic information from the utilities. Utilities are required to pub-
lish their rates and conditions and are obliged to offer their services to
everyone within their service area.362 Utilities, for their part, are
treated as regulated monopolies and are granted a guaranteed rate of
return on investments and are exempt from the antitrust laws within
their service areas. 63
The West German utility industry itself consists primarily of state-
owned utilities. Although there are over twelve hundred electric utili-
ties in the country, ten companies account for sixty-five percent of the
electric power production .3  Utility rates are regulated by the Federal
Minister of the Economy, which administers the Btmdesiarifordmnng
Elektrizitat (BTO Elt).365 The BTO Elt sets guidelines for utility rates
but sets no specific price ceiling on rates. Instead, it requires that utili-
ties obtain prior authorization for rate increases according to standards
360. Id at 31.
361. Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Power Industries Act), 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBIJ I
1451 (W. Ger.).
362. Allgemeine Anschluss-Und Versorgungspflicht.
363. Gesetz gegen Wettbe werbs beschrankungen (GWB) (Law Against Restraints of
Competition) § 103, 1974 BGB1 869 (W. Ger.).
364. B. MITCHELL & P. KLEINDORFER, REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTER-
PRIsE 59 (1979).
365. Bundestarifordnung Elektrizitat (BTO Elt), 1980 BGBI I 122 (W. Ger.).
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of safe and reasonably priced delivery of electricity. The BTO Ell is
actually enforced by state agencies who regulate the utilities subject to
the authority of the Federal Ministry of the Economy.
At the present time, decommissioning funds are not being col-
lected during the plant's operation, though there is a perceived need for
the accumulation of such funds. 6 In the more general area of funding
radioactive waste disposal, section 21(3) of the Atomic Energy Law
now provides that costs for interim and final storage of nuclear wastes
should be collected from the nuclear plant operators where the wastes
are generated, possibly by requiring advance payments when the oper-
ating license is granted.367
The Atomic Energy Law might similarly be amended to require
that funds sufficient to cover decommissioning costs be paid into a spe-
cial fund at the time the plant is licensed. These funds could then be
recovered by the utility through the rate base over the plant's operating
life.
An additional factor affecting decommissioning financing is that of
utility liability for third party injuries resulting from accidents at
decommissioned nuclear plants. Under section 25 of the Atomgeselz,
the nuclear power plant operator is liable to third parties for injuries to
persons and property up to a one billion Deutschemark limit (approxi-
mately $410 million) per accident. 368 The regulations promulgated
pursuant to this section of the Atomic Energy Law specifically provide
that decommissioned plants are covered by the liability limit, the spe-
cific limit being reduced according to the level of radioactivity remain-
ing in the plant.
369
E. Radioactive Waste Storage and Residue Level Standards
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding decommissioning
financing in West Germany, there is a lack of well-defined policy in
two areas with substantial and direct effects on reactor decommission-
ing: radioactive waste storage and acceptable radioactive residue levels
for release of a decommissioned reactor. The original Atomic Energy
366. Essmann, supra note 335, at 44.
367. Atomgesetz § 21(3), 1976 (W. Ger.), citedin Strohl, Legal, Administrative and Finan.
cialAspects of Long Term Management of Radioactive Waste, 21 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 77,82
(1978). The West German cabinet recently issued a draft ordinance that would require nu-
clear facility operators to make advance payments for the ultimate disposal of their nuclear
waste in planned government facilities. NUCLEONICS WK., Dec. 24, 1981, at 8.
368. 1975 BGBI II 957 (W. Ger.).
369. Atomrechtliche Deckungsvorsorge-Verordnung-At Deck § 12, 1977 BGBI 1 220
(W. Ger.).
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Law, enacted in 1959, dealt with nuclear waste in only a general way,
providing that the supervising agency was empowered to order nuclear
waste storage in a place of its designation? 70 The Atomic Energy Law
was amended in 1976 to provide that nuclear power plant operators are
responsible for ensuring that nuclear waste, including radioactive parts
of the plant which are removed or dismantled, is disposed of safely and
at the operator's cost.371 The Atomic Energy Law, therefore, clearly
includes decommissioning waste in its definition of nuclear waste. It
also states that the safe disposal of this waste is the operator's responsi-
bility under the polluter-pays principle (Verursacherprinzo).
At the same time, the Atomic Energy Law provides that the Feder-
ation is responsible for the construction and operation of nuclear waste
disposal sites.372 At the present time, however, there are no operating
nuclear waste disposal sites.3 73 Because of the FRG's population den-
sity, siting a waste repository presents particularly difficult problems.
The preferred mode is storage in underground mining cavities. 374 The
Asse salt mine was used for the storage of intermediate and low level
wastes through 1978, and is currently being reactivated for use.375 Be-
cause of the bulky size of decommissioning wastes, however, this site is
not considered suitable for their disposal.376
It appears then, that until a suitable waste disposal site for decom-
missioning wastes is available, decommissioned nuclear power plants
will not be dismantled, but will have to remain in some type of protec-
tive storage. Having such a site available will have a great influence on
decommissioning policy in West Germany in the years ahead.
377
In addition to uncertainty concerning decommissioning waste dis-
posal, West Germany also has not issued well-defined standards on the
acceptable levels of radioactive residues for unrestricted release of a
decommissioned plant. Neither the existing radiation protection regu-
lations3 78 nor Safety Criterion 2. 10,17 pertaining to decommissioning,
speak directly to this issue.
370. Atomgesetz § 19(3), 1959 BGBl I 814 (W. Ger.).
371. Atomgesetz § 9a(l), 1976 BGB1 1 3053 (W. Ger.).
372. Atomgesetz § 9(3), 1976 BGB I1 3053 (W. Ger.).
373. Auler, Brewitz & Reichenbecher, supra note 334, at 240.
374. Id
375. G. Calkins, Memorandum, supra note 333, at 18.
376. Essmann, supra note 335, at 56.
377. A further complication involves legal disputes over the required licensing proce-
dures for waste disposal facilities. See German Fuel Storage and Waste Projects Snarled in
Legal Morass, NUCLEONICS WK., Sept. 17, 1981, at 4-5.
378. Strahlen Schatzverordnung, October 13, 1976, 1976 BGBI 1 2905 (W. Ger.).
379. See supra text accompanying note 358.
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F. Summary
The overriding theme for reactor decommissioning in West Ger-
many is uncertainty: uncertainty as to the proper or acceptable mode(s)
of decommissioning; uncertainty as to the financing of future decom-
missioning, whether planned or premature; uncertainty as to the ulti-
mate release of reactor sites for unrestricted use; and uncertainty
concerning the ultimate disposal of decommissioning wastes. Although
the Atomic Energy Law, as amended in 1976, moves in the proper di-
rection in explicitly dealing with decommissioning, further guidance, in
the form of either legislation or regulations, or both, is needed before
large commercial reactors can be safely and effectively
decommissioned.
VI. REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING IN CANADA
A. Scope of the Problem
There are currently nine nuclear power plants operating in Ca-
nada, 38 accounting for approximately five percent of the country's
electricity.381 By the year 2000, the nuclear share of electricity gener-
ated in Canada may be, by one estimate, over forty percent.3 82 All of
the currently operating reactors and those planned are of the Cana-
dian-Deuterium-Uranium (CANDU) type, a heavy water-moderated
reactor designed and built in Canada.383
Canada has not yet established any policies or regulations relating
to reactor decommissioning. In addition, there have been no major
decommissioning projects yet undertaken in the country. Canadian of-
ficials have thus far looked to United States decommissioning experi-
ence and their own limited experience with component replacements in
several research and power reactors for guidance on reactor decommis-
sioning.384 The 250 MWe Gentilly I commercial nuclear reactor has
been shut down, however, and is expected to be decommissioned, pos-
380. NUCLEONICS WK., April 26, 1982, at 11.
381. Swaigen & Boyden, Federal Regulation of Nuclear Facilities in Canada; Better Safe
Than Sorry, 45 SASK. L. Rav. 53, 54 (1980).
382. Id
383. Boyd, Licensing and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in Canada 3, INFO-0051
(AECB) (1981). The CANDU reactor also represents tremendous export potential for Ca-
nada. According to two commentators: "The money to be made through this trade in nu-
clear technology and uranium and the international prestige to be gained have caused the
government and industry to play down the enormity of some of the problems of nuclear
energy." Swaigen & Boyden, supra note 381, at 54.
384. Unsworth, Decommissioning of the CANDU-PHW Reactor, in DECOMMISSIONINo
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES: PROCEEDING OF A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMIDER 1978,
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sibly by the crown corporation Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
(AECL) 85 In the one study performed to date on the decommission-
ing of a CANDU reactor, the author of the study, AECL, concluded
that decommissioning could be best performed by mothballing for a
limited time period followed by dismantlement.
38 6
B. Regulatory Background
Canada is a confederation of ten provinces and two large and un-
developed territories administered by the federal government. Ca-
nada's constitution is partly expressed in the Canada Act of 198211 and
the Constitution Act of 1867, formerly the British North America Act
of 1867, but much is unwritten, adopting the common law and legal
concepts from England. Canada's provinces are largely self-governing,
but the Constitution Act gives the Canadian Parliament (of the federal
government) the power to make laws for the "peace, order and good
government of Canada." '388
Canada's electric utilities are predominantly owned by the prov-
ince in which they are located, and all commercial nuclear reactors are
owned by provincially-owned utilities. 8 9 Because it is the utilities who
initially decide whether or not to build a nuclear power plant, the pro-
vincial governments each decide initially whether nuclear power plants
are necessary and desirable as suppliers of electricity.39°
Once the decision is made by a province to build a nuclear power
plant, the federal government must then ensure that the plant is built
and operated according to accepted health and safety standards. The
Atomic Energy Control Act, enacted in 1946 and subsequently
amended in 1954, declared atomic energy to be a matter of national
concern and established the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) to
administer the Act. 91
JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND NEA (OECD) 81-82 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Unsworth].
385. Personal Communication with Hugh Spence, Atomic Energy Control Board of Ca-
nada (Feb., 1981).
386. Unsworth, Decommissioning of the CANDU-PHIV Reactor, AECL-5687 (1977). re-
suits summarized in Unsworth, supra note 384, at 76-80. See also Lacy & Montford, Decon-
tamination Experience in Ontario Hydro, in DECONTAMINATION AND DEcOMMISSIONING OF
NUCLEAR FACILrrIES 93 (M. Osterhout ed. 1980).
387. Canada Act, ch. 11 (1982).
388. CAN. CONST. of 1867, § 91.
389. Boyd, supra note 383, at 2.
390. Jennekens, Nuclear Regulation--The Canadian Approach 6, AECB. INFO-0047
(1981).
391. Atomic Energy Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. A-19, § 1 (1946), amended b; ch.
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The Act was challenged in the 1956 case, Pronto Uranium Mines
Ltd v. Ontario Labour Relations Board,392 as outside the scope of fed-
eral legislative authority. In holding the Atomic Energy Control Act
and its regulations valid in controlling civilian and military use of nu-
clear energy from the uranium mining stages through the ultimate use
of atomic energy, the Ontario High Court reasoned that atomic energy
is "from its inherent nature . . . of concern to the nation as a whole,
and hence legislation in relation thereto is competent to Parliament as
being for the peace, order and good government of Canada. ' 393
C. Relevant Legislation and Regulations
The Atomic Energy Control Act is a short, very general piece of
legislation that established the AECB to control and supervise "the de-
velopment, application and use of atomic energy. '394 The Act gives the
47 (1953-54). The only other enacted nuclear energy legislation in Canada is the Nuclear
Liability Act, which took effect in 1976 and has since been amended. Can. Gaz. pt. I, order
#2/NLA/80, Nov. 22, 1980. The Act requires operators of large commercial nuclear power
plants to carry $75 million of insurance for damage to persons and property, For claims
above this amount, the Act gives the federal government discretion to establish a Nuclear
Damage Claims Commission, if the federal government deems such a tribunal necessary. It
is not clear whether a reactor in the process of being decommissioned is covered by the terms
of this act. The Act lists all nuclear facilities that its provisions govern, but does not indicate
whether or not they must be operating. Id (Schedule).
392. 5 D.L.R.2d 342 (1956). The original cause of action related to a provincial govern-
ment's authority to regulate the labor relations of uranium mining companies. The court
held that the provincial labor relations board had no jurisdiction to certify a union's applica-
tion to represent the uranium mining companies' workers.
393. Id at 342. See also Denison Mines Ltd. v. Canada, 32 D.L.R.3d 419 (1972), in
which the Ontario high courts reaffirmed Parliament's power to pass laws for the control of
atomic energy as legitimate for the "peace, order and good government of Canada." Id at
420.
Canada's court system is vertically integrated; provincial courts and the federally cre-
ated appellate tribunal apply both federal and provincial law. The courts in Canada are not
equal to the legislative branch (Parliament), as in the United States, but were created by a
specific act of Parliament. The Supreme Court Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. S-19 (1970), as
amended by ch. 44 (1st Supp. 1969-1970).
Like other common law jurisdictions, Canada has no independent system of adminis-
trative courts. The regular courts review administrative actions. See I-C J. ZIEC;EL & J.
BRIERLEY, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIvE LAW C-I l, C-16
(V. Knapp ed. 1979).
394. Atomic Energy Control Act (Preamble). Originally, the AECB was responsible for
both the promotion and regulation of atomic energy in Canada. The 1954 amendment to
the Act transferred the Board's research and development duties to a minister with the au-
thority to establish government-owned, or crown, corporations in the nuclear field. Atomic
Energy Control Act, ch. A-10(2). As a result, responsibility for Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited (AECL), a crown corporation established in 1952, was transferred from the AECB
to a designated minister. Boyd, supra note 383, at 1. The objectives of AECL, which holds a
dominant position in Canada's nuclear industry, are to develop cost-effective nuclear power,
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AECB authority to establish regulations for, inter alia, the licensing of
nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plants.395 The regulations
presently in force were established by the five-member AECB in
1974.396
The Board may require a utility to be licensed in order to build
and operate a nuclear power plant, although the Board has discretion
to waive this requirement. 397 The license itself "may contain such con-
ditions as the Board deems necessary in the interests of health, safety
and security . . . ," including specifications as to "(e) the method of
disposing of radioactive or other hazardous material resulting from the
operation of the nuclear facility."398 This section could reasonably be
interpreted to allow the AECB to set conditions for reactor decommis-
sioning in order to obtain an operating license, but such conditions
would be completely discretionary with the Board. Thus far, the Board
has not acted to set decommissioning requirements for any nuclear
power plant licensees.
The AECB's regulations also allow for the amendment of a license
by the Board, as well as Board directives to a licensee who intends to
surrender his license "to take such measures as are considered neces-
sary for the protection of persons and property until such time as...
the activities being carried out under the authority of the license have
been properly terminated. ' 399 These provisions can be reasonably in-
terpreted to allow the AECB to amend a reactor operating license to a
conduct atomic energy research, operate nuclear reactors, and produce radioactive isotopes
and associated equipment. LAw REFORM COMMISSION, THE ATOMIc ENERGY CONrROL
BOARD 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAw REFORM COMM'N].
395. Atomic Energy Control Act, ch. A-9(b).
396. Atomic Energy Control Regulations, SOR/74-334, June 4, 1974, Can. Gaz. p. 11,
vol. 108, no. 12 (superseded SOR/72-301, Can. Gaz. p. II, vol. 106, no. 16. Aug. 23, 1972;
which superseded SOR/60-I19, Can. Gaz. p. II, voL 94, no. 7, April 13, 1960). The rcgula-
tions were subsequently amended in 1978 (SOR 78-58, Can. Gaz. p. I, vol. 112, no. 16, Jan.
16, 1978) and 1979 (SOR/79-422, Can. Gaz. p. II, vol. 113, no. II, May 22, 1979). These
amendments, however, are not relevant to this discussion.
397. Atomic Energy Control Regulations §§ 8, 10, SOR/DORS/74-334, June 4. 1974,
Can. Gaz. pt. I, vol. 108, no. 12. No commercial reactor, however, has been built and
operated without a license from the AECB.
398. Id § 9(2). Section 9(l)(g) of the regulations allows the Board to require from the
licensee such information as it determines necessary to evaluate the license application.
Such information could conceivably include plans for decommissioning, but again would be
completely within the Board's discretion.
The licensing process basically consists of site acceptance, construction approval, and
the issuance of an operating license. For a complete review of the process, see Joyce, The
Licensing Process for Nuclear Power Reactors-Revision 1, AECB- 1139 Rev. 1 (1979).
399. Atomic Energy Control Regulations §§ 27, 28, SOR/DORS/74-334, Can. Gaz. pt.
II, voL 108, no. 12, June 4, 1974.
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possession-only license, as it has done in the case of the Gentilly I reac-
tor,'400 and to allow the Board to require such decommissioning meas-
ures as it deems necessary to protect life and property. Again, such
measures are entirely within the discretion of the AECB. The AECB
has indicated, however, that formal Board approval would be required
for decommissioning, although what this approval would entail is not
clearly stated.40'
There is, therefore, nothing in the Atomic Energy Control Act or
in the regulations that specifically addresses decommissioning or re-
quires any specific measures to be taken with respect to nuclear waste
disposal. At present, there is no licensed facility for nuclear waste dis-
posal. It is postulated by an AECL representative, however, that in
thirty to forty years, when there will be a need for reactor decommis-
sioning, a suitable underground facility for radioactive waste disposal
will have been developed.40 2 Aside from ignoring reactor decommis-
sioning due to premature shutdown, this statement relies on future
measures not yet planned or in place.40 3
In addition, there are currently no standards in Canada for the
maximum residual activity levels permissible for unrestricted release at
a reactor site. The present Canadian position of "wait and see" is
based on research results at specific reactor sites. °4
There has also been no policy established for financing decommis-
sioning. Utilities with nuclear power plants are not presently collecting
funds for the eventual decommissioning of reactors.405 Moreover, no
plans have yet been made for financing the cost of cleaning up and
decommissioning a reactor prematurely shut down by an accident or
400. Unsworth supra note 384, at 85.
401. Boyd, supra note 383, at 5.
402. Unsworth, supra note 384, at 85.
403. Canada, in fact, indicated in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation that it
plans to hold open specific programs for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle for at least
one year. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION, SPENT FUEL MANAGE-
MENT-REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 6, at 76, INFCE/PC/2/9 (1980).
404. Unsworth, supra note 384, at 83. Permissible radiation exposure standards, con-
tained in § 19 and Schedule II of the Atomic Energy Control Regulations, are based on
recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Hamel &
Morrisset, Safety in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2, (AECB) INFO-0015 (1980).
405. But see Unsworth, supra note 384, at 84, for the opinion that decommissioning costs
are insignificant when viewed in terms of the total cost of electricity. Unsworth also suggests
the possibility that decommissioning might be financed by selling the heavy water inventory
of the CANDU reactor. Id This latter possibility depends on two uncertain conditions:
1) having a future buyer for the heavy water inventory, and 2) selling the heavy water at a
price sufficient to cover the cost to decommission the reactor.
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technical problems.' Concern over the state's responsibility for reac-
tor decommissioning vis-a-vis that of the private utility industries is not
significant in Canada where the provinces own and operate the utilities.
The potential problem of utility insolvency and inability to finance and
carry out decommissioning also would not be a significant issue in Ca-
nada. The equitable distribution of the decommissioning cost burden
on those benefitting from nuclear power plant electricity, however, will
not be met by Canada's apparently ad hoc approach to funding decom-
missioning. In addition, the public and the utilities will be insulated
from considering decommissioning until the need arises. Thus, decom-
missioning will not be considered in the initial decision as to whether
or not a nuclear power plant should be built.
The picture of the atomic energy industry in Canada that emerges
is one of almost total government domination. AECL is responsible for
nuclear research and development, as well as for the design and con-
struction of Canada's large commercial nuclear power plants. 40 7 The
provincially-owned and operated utilities are responsible for the initial
decision to build a nuclear plant and, later, the cost of building, operat-
ing, and presumably, decommissioning the plant. The Atomic Energy
Control Board, as the regulatory authority, is caught between "the
complex and conflicting political cross-pressures that arise in relation-
ships between a federal nuclear entrepreneur (AECL) and provincial
utilities."'4"
How this cross-pressure might affect reactor decommissioning,
particularly its funding, is not immediately apparent. The "historic co-
ziness" of the AECB-AECL relationship could, however, affect the
AECB's position on decommissioning.4"9 In its review of the AECB,
the Law Reform Commission of Canada concluded that, although the
AECB is moving in the right direction, it "has not yet achieved an ap-
propriate degree of independence from the activities it regulates."
4 10
The AECB, like the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
406. Personal communication with Hugh Spence, Atomic Energy Control Board of Ca-
nada (Feb., 1982). Mr. Spence suggested to the author that if decommissioning funds could
not be recovered through the rate base in this situation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
might help defray the cost. This might require an additional appropriation from the Cana-
dian Parliament.
407. See supra note 406.
408. LAw REFORM COMM'N, supra note 394, at 2.
409. Id at 33.
410. Id at 32. See also Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board, in THE REGULATORY
PROCESS IN CANADA 314, 342 (G. Doern ed. 1978). Doer also notes that the AECB has
traditionally perceived its primary constituencies as other government agencies, utilities, and
nuclear experts, but not the public. Id at 347.
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sion is primarily concerned with health and safety issues and not the
economics of nuclear power. In sharp contrast to the NRC, however,
the AECB is given extensive discretionary power by the broad and gen-
eralized Atomic Energy Control Act and regulations. Although the
AECB itself recognizes this as a common situation in Canadian law,411
the Law Reform Commission of Canada found that "the lack of statu-
tory direction on agency [AECB] procedures is striking in contrast to
otherfederal regulatory agencies and particularly in contrast to Ameri-
can nuclear regulatory processes." 4 2 The President of the AECB has
vowed to avoid what he calls "design and operation by regulation" and
"the plethora of regulatory hearings such as that which has occurred in
the United States. 41  Thus far, the AECB has been successful in its
efforts.
D. Proposed Legislation
In 1977 a bill was introduced in the Canadian Parliament which
would have substantially altered the nuclear regulatory framework in
Canada.41 4 The bill would have abolished the AECB and replaced it
with a new regulatory agency with a clear mandate and sole responsi-
bility for health, safety, and the security of nuclear facilities, but not the
promotion of nuclear power. This new regulatory agency would have
the power to establish regulations for decommissioning and waste dis-
posal sites.415 This legislation also mandated the establishment of a
radioactive decontamination fund to be built up by the prescribed pay-
ments of licensees and used for nonrecoverable expenses incurred in
decontamination. Decommissioning would not be funded from this
source.416 The bill, however, died in Parliament largely due to the op-
position of several provincial governments who saw the bill as en-
croaching upon an area of exclusive provincial control.4"7
411. Boyd, supra note 383, at 2.
412. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 394, at 8 (emphasis added).
413. Jennekens, supra note 390. The AECB's regulatory philosophy is based on the no.
tion that the burden should be on the utility, or other license applicant, to demonstrate that
health and safety standards are developed and adhered to. This "front line" concept places
a much greater technical burden on the utilities, and can also lead to dependence by the
AECB on the technical expertise and standards of the regulated utility. LAW RtFoRM
COMM'N, supra note 394, at 24.
414. Nuclear Control and Administration Act, Bill C-14, 30th Parl., 3d Sess., 26 Eliz. II
(1977), in 21 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 11 (Supp. 1978).
415. Id. §§ 56(1)(q), 56(l)(x).
416. Id §§ 51, 53, 54.
417. Swaigen & Boyden, supra note 381, at 56. For a thorough discussion of Bill C-14's
specific provisions, see id
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E. Summary
Decommissioning policy in Canada remains an unanswered issue.
Neither the legislation nor the regulations speak directly to the subject.
No permanent waste disposal strategy or residual radioactivity limits
for site release have been decided. No financing scheme for planned or
premature decommissioning policy is currently in place. At the same
time, Canada is a country where the federal government is both the
regulator and the dominant entrepreneur of the nuclear industry. Bar-
ring a substantial change in policy, reactor decommissioning in Canada
is destined to remain in the hands of the technocrats of the AECB, the
AECL, and the provincial utilities, and will be dealt with on an ad hoc
basis.
VII. REACTOR DECOMMISSIONING IN AN
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Is there any role for international organizations in establishing re-
actor decommissioning policy? Two international organizations, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency,
have considered the issue of reactor decommissioning to a limited
extent.
A. International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA was formed in 1956 with the dual mandate to promote
the "peaceful" uses of atomic energy, as well as to support the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons418 In promoting the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, the IAEA is empowered to support research and devel-
opment projects for civilian use of nuclear energy and to foster ex-
change of scientific and technical information among its signatories. 4 9
The IAEA, for example, provides advisory services in the drafting of
domestic nuclear energy legislation to its member states.42° With re-
spect to decommissioning, the IAEA has supported the exchange of
technical information through the formation of expert committees to
review decommissioning status42 and the joint sponsorship, with the
418. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art. 1I, 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 4.
419. Id
420. See, e-g., 1AE.4 Provides Advisory Services in Nuclear Legislation to Chile and
Ghana, 27 NUCLEAR L. BULL 24 (June, 1981).
421. Saddington, National Policies and their International Aspects, in DECOMMISSIONING
OF NUCLEAR FAcILTEs: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, VIENNA, 13-17 NOVEMBER 1978.
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Nuclear Energy Agency, of a symposium on decommissioning held in
Vienna in 1978.422
A 1978 meeting of the IAEA Advisory Group Committee resulted
in a draft code and guide for reactor decommissioning recommending
that two decommissioning plans be required: a preliminary plan dur-
ing reactor design which, though not detailed, would ensure the consid-
eration of decommissioning during plant design and licensing; and a
detailed plan to be submitted prior to the actual decommissioning of
the reactor. 23 Several IAEA member states, however, objected to the
issuance of such a code, and it has subsequently been withheld.24
This lack of consensus on an IAEA decommissioning code would
seem to reflect the general air of uncertainty concerning decommission-
ing policy, as well as emphasize the reluctance of at least some member
states to be bound by IAEA nuclear reactor standards. Although nu-
clear law is generally considered to be a particularly "international-
ized" branch of the law, "there are still no mandatory international
standards for the licensing of nuclear plants."425 Thus, while exchange
of technical information on reactor operation and decommissioning
proceeds on an international scale, the groundwork for an international
nuclear licensing scheme has not even been laid, nor can it be expected
soon.
4 26
B. Nuclear Energy Agency
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established in 1972 by the
JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE IAEA AND NEA (OECD) 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sad-
dington]. Results of the technical meetings on decommissioning have been documented in
IAEA-UIT Technical Documents 179 (1975) and 205 (1977).
422. See generall, IAEA 1979, supra note 10.
423. Saddington, supra note 421, at 6.
424. Manion, A Review of Recent D & D Program Activities in the International Contntu
nity, in DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 3, 5 (M. Oster-
hout ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Manion]. The United States officially supports the
IAEA's efforts to develop construction codes and standards acceptable to the IAEA Member
States. See Rowden (former NRC Commissioner), Nuclear Power Regulation in the United
States.- .4 Current Domestic and International Perspective, 17 ATOM. ENERGY L,J. 102, 120
(1975).
425. Pelzer, The Nature and Scope of International Cooperation in Connection with the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and its Limits-An Assessment, 27 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 34,
38 (June, 1981).
426. The IAEA, however, has recognized a need for uniformity of nuclear regulations:
"To facilitate trade and to promote development it is essential that the nuclear safety stan-
dards and regulations throughout the world should be as uniform as possible." INTERNA-
TIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LAW FOR A DEVELOPING WORLD 8 (Legal
Series #5, 1969).
[Vol. 6
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
replacing the OECD's European Nuclear Energy Agency.42 NEA
member countries include the European members of OECD, the
United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Thus, unlike the IAEA,
NEA membership is quite limited. Among the NEA's objectives are
the "harmonization of governments' regulatory policies and practices
in the nuclear field, with particular reference to the safety of nuclear
installations. . . [and] radioactive waste management," developing sci-
entific and technical information exchanges, and establishing interna-
tional research and development efforts jointly operated by OECD
countries.428
The NEA's primary efforts with respect to reactor decommission-
ing have been the co-sponsorship of the 1978 IAEA meeting on reactor
decommissioning,429 and a 1980 meeting of NEA members on the tech-
nical aspects of reactor decommissioning. 430 The NEA is also negotiat-
ing a cooperative venture to decommission a nuclear power plant in
Sweden 43 ' The NEA's decommissioning efforts have, thus far, been
focused predominantly on the technical, rather than the regulatory as-
pects of decommissioning.
C. Decommissioning and Nuclear Export Policy
Another important international aspect of decommissioning that
deserves brief mention is the question of a nuclear exporting nation's
responsibility, if any, for reactor decommissioning in importing coun-
tries. Nuclear exporting countries, which include the United States, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada, are exporting a potentially
serious nuclear waste disposal problem in the form of reactor decom-
missioning. Often the importers, generally Third World nations, apply
less stringent safety standards than supplier countries to the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear plants and the subsequent storage of the
427. 25 NUCLEAR L. BULL. (inner cover) (1980).
428. Id The NEA works in close collaboration with the IAEA, with which it has signed
a cooperation agreement.
429. See supra text accompanying note 423.
430. NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (OECD), PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIALISTS MEETING
ON DECOMMISSIONING REQUIREMENTS IN THE DESIGN OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES (1980)
[hereinafter cited as NEA 1980]. The NEA has also issued two technical reports on decom-
missioning: Cutting Techniques as Related to Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (1981),
and Decontamination Methods as Related to Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (1981).
431. Wallauschek, lntroductory,4ddress, in NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (OECD), PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SPECIALISTS MEETING ON DECOMMISSIONING REQUIREMENTS IN TIlE
DESIGN OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 13, 14 (1980).
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wastes.4 32 None of the nuclear supplier countries address the subject of
nuclear waste disposal in export agreements either to urge safe disposal
or to offer technical assistance.433 In fact, with permanent waste dispo-
sal and decommissioning policies not yet established in nuclear export-
ing nations, it is unrealistic to think that these same nations will guide
importers' policies in these areas.
434
D. Summary
In sum then, although the IAEA and the NEA encourage ex-
changes of technical information concerning decommissioning, these
organizations have not acted to develop regulatory guidelines for reac-
tor decommissioning. Members of these international organizations
have not been willing to sacrifice their sovereignty in the area of nu-
clear reactor licensing. At the same time, the NEA and the IAEA serve
as useful forums for discussion of the technical and regulatory aspects
of reactor decommissioning. Nuclear exporting nations have not been
willing, thus far, to assume responsibility for clean up of nuclear wastes
or reactor decommissioning in importing nations.4 35 Certainly, as long
432. Spector & Shields, Nuclear Waste Disposal- An International Legal Perspective, I
Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 569, 574 (1979).
433. Id
434. The nuclear export policy of the United States has been and continues to be a hotly
debated topic. In 1978, Congress enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-3282 (1979), and amended the standards for nuclear export licensing, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2160(a) (1979). The primary purpose of these changes was to control nuclear ex-
ports to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1979), The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act does, however, contain an environmental protection section,
42 U.S.C. § 2153(e), which provides that: "The President shall endeavor to provide in any
agreement [for the peaceful use of nuclear energy] for cooperation between the parties in
protecting the international environment from radoiactive, chemical, or thermal contamina-
tion arising from peaceful nuclear activities." For a discussion of the potential impact of this
section, see Krauland, NEPA, Nukes, and Non-Proieration." Clarfying the Transnational
Impact Statement Mandate in Nuclear Export Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
201, 248-52 (1981).
For treatment of the related issue of the international reach of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 and the need for an environmental impact statement for reactor
exports, see D.C Circuit Upholds Nuclear Export to Philppines, Divides on Question of
NEPA4s International Reach, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,078 (1981).
435. During the past several years, increasing attention has been focused on the proposal
for an international waste disposal regime. Most of this discussion has centered on weapons
proliferation and the environmental dangers of high-level waste, primarily spent nuclear
fuel. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION, WASTE MANAGE-
MENT AND DISPOSAL-REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 7, INFCE/PC/2/9 (1980); Handl, Manl-
aging Nuclear Wastes: The International Connection, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 267 (1981):
STANFORD LAW GROUP, EVALUATION OF AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL
AUTHORITY (J. Barton ed. 1978).
[Vol. 6
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
as uncertainty as to how to handle nuclear wastes in general, and
decommissioning waste in particular, continues to be the rule in nu-
clear exporting countries such as the United States, West Germany,
and Canada, it is not reasonable to expect them to account or plan for
the wastes generated by exported reactors.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Necessity of a Decommissioning Policy
Reactor decommissioning needs to be addressed now. If govern-
ments and nuclear regulators fail to act prospectively to deal with
decommissioning, they may be saddled with the responsibilities of
financing and conducting reactor decommissioning.436 This is certainly
one of the strongest lessons to be learned from the Three Mile Island
accident.
Largely deferring consideration of decommissioning until the end
of a reactor's operating life, as is currently the case in both Canada and
the United States, prevents it from being a factor in the decision to
build and license a nuclear power plant. This is misleading both to the
public and to the nuclear industry for it prevents full consideration of
the costs and of the health and safety effects of nuclear power. This
issue also raises the fundamental question as to whether society should
direct or merely react to technological change and its byproducts.
It is essential to recognize the distinction between planned decom-
missioning and decommissioning following premature reactor shut-
down. Both situations present unique technical and regulatory
problems and both must be dealt with in any comprehensive decom-
missioning regulatory scheme.
Recommendations for specific decommissioning legislation and
regulations will vary between countries, but several objectives for
decommissioning regulation should be common to all. As a first step,
decommissioning terminology needs to be clearly defined, rather than
continually changed, as the United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission seems wont to do. Ideally, an internationally accepted decom-
missioning terminology should be adopted. This uniform terminology
would facilitate international exchange of technical and regulatory in-
436. Hearings, 1977, supra note 12, at 79, 81 (statement of Monte Canfield, Jr.). Can-
field, Director of the General Accounting Office's Energy and Minerals Division. observed
that the federal government had already paid S85 million for uranium mill tailings clean-up
and may spend up to $600 million to decontaminate and decommission the fuel reprocessing
plant at West Valley, New York. Id
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formation on decommissioning and pave the way for international
guidelines for reactor decommissioning.
B. Timing
Decommissioning should be considered from the time of a utility's
initiation of plans to build a nuclear power plant.437 Thus, utility com-
missions with ratemaking responsibilities should include decommis-
sioning costs in the assessment of the cost of nuclear-generated
electricity in comparison to alternative sources.
An initial decommissioning plan should be prepared at this time
by the licensee. Given the nature of the subject matter, an activity
planned for thirty to forty years in the future cannot necessarily be ex-
traordinarily detailed. It should, however, contain the best estimates
on the costs and the preferred method of decommissioning the particu-
lar plant proposed to be built. Complete removal of the plant and res-
toration of the site should be shown to be technically feasible. In
addition, it has been suggested that the plan should identify the waste
disposal site to be used for decommissioning wastes and specify a con-
tingent site or plan if the primary site is not available. Any decommis-
sioning regulations adopted should apply equally to planned and
existing nuclear power plants. In the case of existing plants, this would
mean that a decommissioning plan would be required at some reason-
able time after the legislation and regulations take effect.
Advanced planning for decommissioning and its consideration in
the licensing process is important for several reasons. First, decommis-
sioning plans should be subject to public scrutiny. The public has the
right to know the costs and the health and safety impacts of decommis-
sioning. In addition, advanced planning and established regulations
give the plant operator a clear procedure to follow in financing and
implementing decommissioning. Most importantly, advanced plan-
ning for decommissioning is crucial to minimize the health and safety
dangers of decommissioning.
This initial decommissioning plan should be updated on a reason-
able, periodic basis, assuming that the plant is licensed and begins op-
eration. This updating would account for plant modification,
437. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR
POWER PRODUCTION 37 (1978); "Whatever the future policies may be, it will be important
for the site layout and the design and construction of nuclear plants to incorporate features
which would aid their eventual decommissioning and dismantling."
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operation, and maintenance characteristics, as well as technical and
economic changes in decommissioning.
When the plant nears the end of its projected life or is shut down
as a result of an accident or technical problems, the operator should be
required to submit a detailed plan prior to the start of decommission-
ing. This plan should be subjected to public scrutiny prior to issuance
of a decommissioning license or amendment of the existing license to
possession-only status. The type of license required to decommission a
nuclear reactor should be clearly spelled out by regulation. This is not
the case, at present, in the United States, West Germany, or Canada. It
is also recommended that this final plan be the subject of an environ-
mental assessment. In the United States, this would certainly translate
into a requirement that an environmental impact statement be pre-
pared prior to each reactor decommissioning pursuant to section
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and that
decommissioning be considered in the initial EIS prepared prior to the
plant's construction.
C. Method
Regulations adopted should not mandate a specific method of
decommissioning. Current uncertainty concerning decommissioning
costs and technology argues for a flexible approach to the regulation of
decommissioning methods. Given our present knowledge, prompt or
delayed dismantlement appear to be the preferred methods of decom-
missioning; "permanent" entombment or mothballing are unacceptable
because they require indeterminately long risks.
With all potential methods, one confronts the problem of having
nuclear waste which must be supervised for thousands of years before it
decays to safe levels."' 8 The longevity of government institutions to
regulate these wastes presents crucial unanswered questions. In any
case, while .decommissioning proceeds, the nuclear regulatory body re-
sponsible for reactor licensing should monitor the progress and make
certain that adequate records are kept.
Prior to the release of a site for unrestricted use, all radioactive
contaminated material should be removed from the site to a waste re-
pository. Radiation standards for unrestricted release of the site should
be strictly enforced. A major problem arises in that neither the United
States, Canada, nor West Germany presently have a permanent nu-
438. For comments on the value-laden concept of "safe" levels of radiation exposure, see
supra note 22 and notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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clear waste disposal site or radiation standards for the release of sites.
This problem highlights the fact that a good decommissioning policy is
tied to the development of a comprehensive nuclear waste disposal pol-
icy. This development has yet to occur, but is nonetheless crucial.
D. Financing
Developing a method of financing decommissioning should be a
primary objective of any decommissioning policy. Although the costs
to decommission a reactor are generally considered to be low compared
to the plant's total capital cost, decommissioning costs could still
amount to well over $100 million,4 39 and perhaps substantially more
given the large uncertainty in present cost estimates. In addition, as the
Three Mile Island accident has demonstrated, premature decommis-
sioning due to accident or technical problems will likely cost substan-
tially more than planned decommissioning.
The most important factors in developing a financing plan for
decommissioning should be assurance and equity. Assurance is of par-
ticular concern where private utilities own and operate nuclear plants,
as in the United States; it should not present as significant a problem in
countries like West Germany and Canada where the utilities are owned
by state or provincial governments. In the United States, where assur-
ing that funds for decommissioning are available in the event of utility
insolvency is a major concern, the federal regulations should require
that premature shutdown insurance be acquired prior to the issuance of
an operating license.
In any case, equity considerations argue that decommissioning be
paid for by those directly benefitting from the nuclear-generated elec-
tricity. Future generations should not be saddled with the cost of nu-
clear waste disposal, including decommissioning. Specific funding
methods for planned decommissioning should be left within the prov-
ince of the traditional regulators of utility rates; the states in the United
States, the states (Lander), subject to federal authority, in West Ger-
many, and the provinces in Canada. The federal nuclear licensing au-
thorities should not become involved in regulating the financing of
decommissioning.
In the United States, where assurance of adequate funds is an im-
portant issue, the NRC should limit its involvement in financing to re-
quiring some form of premature decommissioning insurance. If they
were to go beyond this level of involvement and try to specify and ad-
439. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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minister a particular method of funding planned decommissioning,
they might be challenged by the states under the tenth amendment. 4 °
The NRC would, in this case, be forced to argue that specifying the
method of decommissioning funding was important in protecting the
public's health and safety. The NRC might, however, be successful in
merely requiring that some type of actual, external (to the utility) re-
serve fund be established. The specifics would then be left to each state
to establish.
States should not permit unfunded depreciation adjustments for
decommissioning, but should require some type of external fund to be
accrued over the plant's projected operating life, such as an external
sinking fund.44 This approach addresses both the equity and assur-
ance concerns of decommissioning financing. The states should not au-
thorize the construction of new nuclear plants unless and until the
operating utility can demonstrate an adequate method of decommis-
sioning funding. Such action would certainly seem to be within the
states' traditional ratemaking authority.
E. Regulators and Regulations
The primary role of federal nuclear authorities, such as the NRC
in the United States and the AECB in Canada, should be to provide the
states and reactor operators with complete generic cost estimates and
technical data on decommissioning. 442 The respective roles of the fed-
eral and state governments should be clearly spelled out by the
decomissioning policy adopted.
The bulk of new decommissioning policy, other than that for
decommissioning funding, should take the form of federal regulations.
Legislation directing the establishment of decommissioning regulations
should be enacted in both the United States and Canada as it has been
in West Germany. Such legislation takes total discretion for decom-
missioning. policy out of the hands of the technocrats in the federal
440. See supra text accompanying note 294.
441. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16.
442. An additional question with some important financial implications is the reach of
nuclear third party liability provisions to reactors being decommissioned. The German
Atomgesetz (Atomic Energy Law) clearly applies its liability provisions to decommissioned
reactors (see supra text accompanying notes 368-69). but the situation is not clear in either
the United States (see supra text accompanying notes 179-84) or Canada (see supra note
391). Furthermore, in the case of mothballing, entombment, or delayed dismantlement, it is
not evident whether operators will be required to maintain insurance indefinitely for these
facilities or if federal and/or provincial or state governments will assume liability at some
point in time. See von Busekist, supra note 9, at 37.
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nuclear regulatory agencies. The regulations themselves should bal-
ance the need for flexibility with meaningful, enforceable requirements.
These regulations will particularly take on added significance in the
United States where courts have been very reluctant to overturn the
decisions of the NRC.
44 3
It has been argued by some in the nuclear industry that more regu-
lations will lead to further delays in building nuclear power plants and
possibly even serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety. There are at
least three clear responses to this position. The first is that it is, at best,
arguable that nuclear regulations lead to substantial delays in building
nuclear plants. There is in fact, evidence indicating that the long lead
time in building nuclear plants is primarily the result of contractor de-
lays and construction problems. Second, commercial nuclear power
must be subject to government regulation and public scrutiny because
of its potentially devastating effects on public health and safety. Fi-
nally, new decommissioning regulations will lead to a decline in nu-
clear safety only if poor regulations are adopted.
The International Atomic Energy Agency and OECD's Nuclear
Energy Agency should continue and increase their facilitation of the
exchange of technical and regulatory information between nations. Al-
though the idea of an international nuclear licensing system is not pres-
ently a realistic option, the IAEA and NEA can provide some guidance
by issuing model decommissioning regulations. Nations exporting nu-
clear power plants, which include the United States, West Germany,
and Canada, should help the importing nations, largely Third World
countries, deal with the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle and
decommissioning.
IX. CONCLUSION
Given the international distribution of nuclear power plants,
decommissioning is a problem of global dimensions. Although the nu-
clear industry is largely stagnant and predictions of substantial growth
in worldwide nuclear capacity appear unsupportable,4' the wastes
from existing plants must still be managed. Decommissioning should
not be permitted to be a "hidden" cost of nuclear power.
For too long, nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning have
been ignored in the regulatory framework. As a result, there is pres-
443. See supra note 228.
444. NucLEONICs WK., Sept. 24, 1981, at 8, (quoting W. Hannum, Deputy Director
General, NEA (OECD)).
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ently a lack of balance between legal and technical development in this
area.445
The situation does, however, point to an ever increasing tendency
of the law to catch up with complex and rapidly changing technologies.
This state of affairs is nowhere more vivid than in the nuclear field.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 6
concluded: "Once a series of reactors is operating, it is too late to con-
sider whether the waste they generate should have been produced...
all that remains are engineering details to make the best of the situation
which has been created." It is true that the wastes are inevitable by-
products of operating reactors, but far more remains in dealing with
them than simply "engineering details."
Technical experts have a very important role to play in developing
decommissioning policy. Large bodies of data have already been de-
veloped on the technology and cost of reactor decommissioning. The
general consensus in the technical community seems to be that decom-
missioning technology exists and can be performed at a relatively mi-
nor cost, both monetarily and environmentally, although the present
estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty." 7 This general consen-
sus is good news. It does not, however, set decommissioning policy for
the public-at-large, though it may support and guide that policy. There
is the danger that "repeated expressions of confidence that the technol-
ogy exists [to decommission reactors and dispose of nuclear waste has]
led experts to ignore the more complex institutional questions that re-
main."' 48 Technical experts may be able to tell us how much decom-
missioning costs and how it will affect people's health and safety, by
their estimates, but they cannot tell us how much is too much to spend
on decommissioning, nor how "safe" is safe enough. These latter ques-
tions must be answered by the public, acting both in their individual
capacities and through their governments.
"In a more leisurely period the law could, as Mr. Justice Holmes
suggested it should, lag behind the times."" 9 The lack of attention
given to the decommissioning problem indicates that this approach has
445. von Busekist, supra note 9, at 37.
446. 547 F.2d 633, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, on other grounds. 435 U.S.
519 (1977).
447. See, eg., DGEIS, supra note 28, at vii.
448. Hart & Glaser, supra note 176, at 677.
449. Doub & Weiss, International Nuclear Development in the Age of Interdependence, 32
VAND. L. REv. 843, 884 (1979).
1983]
516 Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review [Vol. 6
largely been followed. Decommissioning, however, and the larger is-
sue of nuclear waste disposal of which it is a part, is a problem that we
can no longer afford to ignore.
